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Preface
The eventual goal of scientific research is to identify causal relationships between differ-
ent classes of objects in order to enrich our understanding of the world. To accomplish
this goal, natural scientists use repeated experiments to test their explanations of causal
relations in nature. The validity of their theories is then inferred empirically by induc-
tive reasoning, based on the implicit assumption that natural laws do not change.
Social sciences, and economics in particular, face more difficulties in identifying
causal relationships due to human nature. People adapt their behavior to their living
circumstances. Therefore, ’laws of human behavior’ cannot immediately be inferred
from repeated observations of individuals, since each time an observation is made, the
individual conditions his or her behavior on past experiences and behaves differently
in the future. For instance, a person faced with the offer to buy the same stocks in
two subsequent periods will not automatically take the same decision, even if his ex-
pectations about future returns do not change. In the second period, his behavior will
depend on the stock market development and the choices made in the first period (see
chapter 1). Hence, omitting experiences individuals made in the past would bias the
results.
A further challenge for the identification of causal effects in economics is that most
real world choices are interdependent. For example, observing wealthy individuals in-
vesting into stocks does not allow concluding that wealth increases the likelihood of
stock ownership, because individuals could also be wealthy because they invest into
stocks.
During the last years, experiments became increasingly popular among economists
to solve both the omitted variables problem and the problem of endogeneity. Three
types of experiments can be distinguished: (i) laboratory experiments, (ii) controlled
field studies or randomized field experiments, and (iii) natural experiments.
The use of lab experiments amplified due to the growing interest in issues such
as economic cooperation, trust, and neuroeconomics, e.g. Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, Rock-
enbach (2006) and Fischbacher, Kosfeld, Fehr (2005). In such experiments, a certain
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treatment is randomly assigned to one group of individuals in order to compare their
economic actions to an untreated control group within the artificial environment of
the lab. By construction, such virtual experiments exclude feedback effects and reduce
potential bias from omitted factors. However, it is unclear if the results from the lab
translate into real world decisions, because people are likely to behave differently if
they make decisions that affect their own lives and their own money (Gul, Pesendorfer,
2005).
An alternative to lab experiments are controlled field experiments, which also ran-
domize treatments but do so in real world applications. Development economists par-
ticularly are increasingly trying to identify the efficiency of their measures by random-
izing the allocation of, for instance, aid or political leadership across the population
(Gertler, 2004; Chattopadhyay, Duflo, 2004). Average effects on people’s behavior can
then be consistently estimated by comparing behavior before and after the allotment
under relatively weak identifying assumptions. However, Deaton (2009) forcefully ar-
gues that consistent statistical interference does not guarantee that such an estimate
has a meaningful interpretation, as it only says something about ’what works’ but
nothing about ’why something works’. Also, there are substantial moral constraints to
randomized field experiments. In the worst case, scarce resources would not be given
to those with the most urgent needs or the best leadership skills but would merely be
distributed randomly across the population for the sake of statistical identifiability.
Natural experiments have the same straightforward identification approach as con-
trolled field studies do. Yet they are not subject to moral constraints. A natural
experiment occurs when some feature of the real world is randomly changed in a way
that allows using the exogenous variation due to this change in order to study causal
effects of an otherwise endogenous explanatory variable. For instance, an unantici-
pated tax reform that only affects one group of investors facilitates the identification of
a causal link between taxation and portfolio choices (see chapters 2 and 3). Thus, one
reason for the popularity of natural experiments in economic research is that they typ-
ically offer an intuitive interpretation of the underlying identifying assumptions and
enable a broader audience to check their consistency compared to purely statistical
identification approaches.
This dissertation consists of five self-contained chapters that are contributions from
research in two areas: behavioral finance and international trade. Each chapter has
its own introduction, references, and appendix and the five parts can be read indepen-
dently from each other. Still, to some extent, the five chapters can be subsumed under
the common theme of ”natural experiments”, as they all make use of changes in real
world environments in order to identify causal effects.
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Chapters 1, 2, and 4 use the German reunification in 1990 as a natural experiment
to study subsequent savings choices. Reunification was unanticipated and prompted
substantial changes in economic behavior among East Germans. Recent studies ex-
ploiting this natural experiment are Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, Shields (2004), Alesina
and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), and Redding and Sturm (2008). Also, post-reunification
changes in savings preferences have been studied for East German households. Build-
ing on the fact that job choices were exogenously restricted before reunification, Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) find that self-selection of risk-averse individuals into
low-risk occupations in West Germany relative to the East is economically important
and decreases aggregate precautionary wealth holdings significantly. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
(2008) also shows that East Germans have higher savings rates than West Germans
and that this East-West gap is increasing in age.
In contrast to the above-mentioned studies, chapters 1, 2, and 4 study portfolio
choices rather than changes in the total wealth or savings of households. Moreover,
no comparison takes place between East and West German households. Rather, the
unique natural experiment of German reunification allows me to eliminate different po-
tential sources of bias, which are common to other studies, in order to identify causal
effects within East Germany only.
Chapter 1 analyzes the non-participation puzzle among East German households
from 1990 to 2006. The non-participation puzzle states that a large proportion of
households in industrialized countries does not own securities despite an expected re-
turn premium on risky assets (Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, 2003). The most widely
accepted explanation for this puzzle is that transaction costs deter households from in-
vesting small amounts of money. The fact that East German investors of all age groups
did not have any prior experience with securities before 1990 helps to identify the im-
portance of different transaction costs motives such as trading costs, habit persistence,
and investment experience on participation decisions. Habit persistence and lack of in-
vestment experience appear as the main reasons for the widespread non-participation,
whereas pure trading costs motives have been largely overestimated in the past. There
is no evidence that historical market returns, which investors experienced over their
life-cycles, affect their risk-taking behavior. These findings are particularly relevant
for policy-makers and financial consultants seeking to establish household portfolios as
an additional pillar of the social security system. In order to increase the acceptance
of private savings plans, they will have to override households’ habit persistence and
reservation with regard to risky assets. Hence, the high degree of habit persistence in
savings decisions strengthens the case for policies that raise the awareness for securi-
ties. Also, the prevalent habit persistence advocates the increased use of savings plans
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which do not require people to opt in but rather allow opting out of private retirement
savings schemes.
Chapter 2 studies two natural experiments to identify the effects of tax incentives
and bequest motives on life-insurance demand. An unanticipated tax reform in 2000
halved the tax exemption limit for capital income in Germany. We document that
the demand for life insurance reacted strongly to this change. This result points out
that standard tax revenue estimates, which assume that current investors would stick
to their asset choices if capital taxation were introduced, may be misleading. Govern-
ments need to account for changes in investment behavior due to tax reforms. With
regard to bequest motives, we analyze the demand for life insurance in the former
German Democratic Republic. Relative to market-based economies, the socialist GDR
can be viewed as an experimental institutional setting where life-insurance demand was
not influenced by tax considerations, which allows us to isolate bequest motives, while
controlling for life-cycle and precautionary motives. We find a significantly higher own-
ership probability among households with children and a high regard for the family,
confirming strong bequest motives in life-insurance demand.
Chapter 3 presents additional evidence for the importance of taxation in house-
holds’ investment decisions. A difference-in-difference analysis shows that a tax reform
in Germany which revoked the tax exemption of life insurance returns triggered a sig-
nificant increase in demand prior to the reform.
Chapter 4 uses the natural experiment of German reunification to study the adop-
tion of East Germans to building society contracts (BSCs) after 1990. A striking feature
of research on financial innovation is the relative dearth of empirical studies analyzing
the adoption of households to new financial products. This chapter analyzes (i) who
uses BSCs to save for a house purchase, and (ii) how long it takes after reunification
until future savers start saving. We find that households with close ties to their families
in the West invest earlier, suggesting the presence of information asymmetries in the
adoption processes. There is also evidence that households trade-off long-term savings
goals for short-term consumption, because initial car owners are more likely to invest
into BSCs and to do so earlier. Life insurance appears to be a substitute for BSCs.
Chapter 5 analyzes differences in the structure of intra-Canadian trade that are due
to language barriers between French and English speakers. While the existence of a
language barrier in trade has been documented in numerous empirical studies (Rose,
2000; Anderson and van Windcoop, 2004; Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2008), these studies
remain silent about the channel through which language impacts trade. Using bilin-
gual regions in Canada to study the effect of language commonality on trade, I test for
one specific mechanism that can explain the existence of a language barrier to trade.
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Specifically, I ask if those industries that require more cross-border communication in
order to export their products trade more between Canadian provinces that know each
other’s language(s). Identification comes from the fact that some Canadian regions
introduced minority-language-friendly legislation in the 1970s, which is uncorrelated
with trade patterns in 2001. There is robust evidence that trade in industries with
a need to communicate directly (orally) with importers increases with the probability
that people in another province speak the same language. This finding reveals a poten-
tial disadvantage for minority language regions in services trade and might also help to
explain part of the observed specialization across industries and sectors in international
trade.
In conclusion, the five chapters of this dissertation provide new insights in the
economic analysis of the areas of behavioral finance and international trade, study-
ing unique natural experiments that permit the identification of causal relationships.
Chapter 1 emphasizes the presence of substantial persistence in investment habits and
analyzes the impact of investment experience on the probability that households own
risky assets. The policy reforms studied in chapters 2 and 3 provide compelling evi-
dence for the importance of tax considerations in households’ savings choices. Chapter
4 shows that social networks and consumption-savings trade-offs determine the adop-
tion process of investors to new financial products. Finally, chapter 5 investigates the
importance of language barriers in trade flows, exploiting the unique language compo-
sition of Canada. All five chapters are part of a broader research agenda that aims at
identifying causal effects in applied economic research. Due to their straightforward in-
terpretability, natural experiments appear well-suited to form a key pillar of this effort
in the future.
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Chapter 1
Tearing Down the Wall:
(Non-)Participation and Habit
Persistence in East German
Securities Markets
1.1 Introduction
Non-participation in securities markets has been an increasingly important issue to
economists and policy-makers alike. So far there is no consensus as to why a large
proportion of households in industrialized countries does not own securities despite
an expected return premium on risky assets (Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, 2003). Yet
policy-makers considering to add an individual-account component to pension systems
need to know whether non-participation is a deliberate decision by informed citizens or
mere unawareness of the risk and return characteristics of stocks and bonds. While the
first would advocate the use of private pension plans, ignorance or financial illiteracy
could justify state intervention into retirement savings choices. A better understanding
of non-participation behavior might also help to explain the size of the equity premium
(Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991).
The most widely accepted explanation for the non-participation puzzle is that trans-
action costs deter households from entering the market (Haliassos, 2008). Such trans-
action costs might be the pecuniary costs of trading. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2000) show that small brokerage fees might suffice to explain part of the observed
non-participation. However, an increasing number of studies points toward behavioral
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explanations that focus on non-monetary transaction costs. Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2007) find strong persistence in households’ holdings of risky assets, which indicates
the presence of substantial opportunity costs to overcome inertia. Other non-monetary
costs could be related to (i) the lack of knowledge about the risk and return charac-
teristics of certain assets that falls with the accrual of ownership experience (Agarwal
et al., 2008) or (ii) individual risk preferences, which were shaped by one’s life-cycle
experience of bull and bear markets (Malmendier and Nagel, 2007). Yet despite their
theoretical importance and empirical persuasiveness, no paper has so far tried to dis-
entangle habit persistence and investment experience from pure trading costs motives
in households’ portfolio choices.
German reunification provides a quasi-experimental setting to study savings ad-
justments among East German households (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005;
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2008). In contrast to Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, Ger-
many does not have a sophisticated equity culture (Calvet, Campbell, Sodini, 2007).
Only 33.2% of households owned securities in 2006. Participation is even lower in the
East. Sixteen years after reunification, only 20.4% of East German households own
stocks and 9.9% hold bonds.1 The fact that the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
barred private ownership of securities offers a unique opportunity to analyze dynamic
participation behavior after reunification, because (i) I can control for individual own-
ership histories between 1990 to 2006, since households had no prior experience with
securities, and (ii) there is no initial conditions problem that typically plagues random
effects estimators in binary choice models.
The estimated effect of monetary transaction costs on non-participation is much
smaller than previously assumed. Rather, non-participation seems to be largely driven
by strong persistence in unobserved savings habits and risk preferences. This is in
accordance with Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), who show that communism left
a long-lasting mark on people’s preferences for individual risk taking and state in-
tervention in East Germany. I also find that the probability of owning risky assets
increases significantly once households gain investment experience. However, there is
little indication that macro-experiences matter for investment decisions. These results
substantiate the case for policies that raise the awareness for securities and reduce in-
dolence, e.g. default options in retirement accounts (Choi, Laibso, Madrian, 2006).
Related work coming closest to my paper is by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a). Using
the 1984 and 1989 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), she finds
that the likelihood of participation in 1989 is 31.8% higher for households that have
already participated in 1984. However, a dynamic probit estimator is potentially bi-
1Author’s calculation based the GSOEP.
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ased in her two-period panel and the longitudinal dimension is too short to test for
persistence in preferences.2 Alessie and Hochguertel (2002) estimate state dependence
among Dutch stock investors, using the CentER Saving panel survey. In their sam-
ple, lagged ownership increases the probability of current ownership by 28 percentage
points. This estimate is potentially upward biased, as the initial conditions problem
is ignored in their estimation strategy. Using the same data, Alessie, Hochguertel,
van Soest (2004) estimate a bivariate dynamic probit model in order to explain the
dynamics of stock and mutual fund ownership. Yet they do not control for potential
autocorrelation in the error structure, which leads to overestimation of the state depen-
dence coefficient, which is 26% for both stocks as well as mutual funds. Finally, Mun˜oz
(2006) estimates a multinominal probit model that distinguishes between persistence
in individual heterogeneity and state dependence, using five waves of the Bank of Italy
Survey of Household Income and Wealth. She finds strong persistence of individual
preferences over time, yet she also ignores the initial conditions problem.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the existing
theoretical explanations for non-participation in securities markets. The identification
strategy is laid out in section 1.3. In section 1.4, the estimation approach is described.
The data is presented in section 1.5. Estimation results are discussed in section 1.6
before I conclude.
1.2 Theoretical Background
One of the most surprising puzzles of individual asset allocation decisions is the low pro-
portion of households holding stocks and bonds, as documented in numerous studies,
e.g. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Porterba and Samwick (1995), Bertraut and Haliassos
(1995), Rosen and Wu (2004). Various explanations for this puzzle have been sug-
gested. Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) argue that borrowing constraints and limited
ability to sell short could solve the puzzle. Other explanations focus on widespread
ignorance of securities markets (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), lack of trust in securities
(Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, 2005), lack of social interaction with other investors (Hong,
Kubik, Stein, 2004), or tax laws (Bergstresser and Poterba, 2004). However, the pre-
vailing explanation is that transaction costs discourage small investors from entering
the market.
In order to better understand the transaction costs explanation of the non-
2For thorough discussions of the bias of dynamic discrete choice models in short panels, see
Heckman (1981), Hsiao (1986), Lee (1997).
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participation puzzle, I recap the essence of the model by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a).
Consider a household i that lives for multiple periods. Consumption at date t is de-
noted by Cit. Financial wealth is denoted as Yit. The return on the riskless asset held
from date t to date t+1 is denoted as rz,t+1. The stochastic net return on the securities
portfolio is denoted by rs,i,t+1. At time t, the household chooses fraction ψit of risky
securities in the total portfolio. A household reveals that its certainty equivalent rate
of return, rces,i,t+1, is larger than rz,t+1 if it chooses to hold securities, i.e. if ψit > 0. The
household optimizes the present value of its lifetime utility from consumption subject
to the growth of its initial wealth endowment less consumption:
Vt(Yt) = max
Cit,ψit
{
U(Cit) + βVt+1
(
(Yit − Cit)
(
1 + ψitr
ce
s,i,t+1 + (1− ψit)rz,t+1
))}
, (1.1)
where Vt(Yt) denotes the value function and β the discount factor. Based on the above
setup, Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) show that households should take positions
in all existing assets, and non-participation as well as exit and entry are not observed.
1.2.1 Pecuniary Transaction Costs
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a), Paiella (2001), and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) argue
that relatively small fixed costs could justify the observed patterns of non-participation.
Let household i face fixed pecuniary entry and exit costs of Fit. Such costs could for
instance be brokerage commissions or the bid-ask spread. Exit costs could include
potential re-entry costs, brokerage commissions, or a capital gains tax, which German
investors face when they hold asset for less than one year. Let the optimal share of
risky investments, ψ∗it > 0, be either exogenously given or determined independently
of the optimal consumption path, as for example in the case of an isoelastic utility
function. Then household i will only buy securities if the present expected value of its
consumption from the risky portfolio, incurring entry costs Fit, is larger than the value
from the riskless portfolio:
max
Cit
{
U(Cit) + βVt+1
(
(Yit − Fit − Cit)
(
1 + ψ∗itr
ce
s,i,t+1 + (1− ψ∗it)rz,t+1
))}
(1.2)
> max
Cit
{
U(Cit) + βVt+1
(
(Yit − Cit)(1 + rz,t+1)
)}
.
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For this inequality to be true, rces,i,t+1 needs to be sufficiently greater than rz,t+1. By a
similar argument, a household will only exit if
max
Cit
{
U(Cit) + βVt+1
(
(Yit − Fit − Cit)(1 + rz,t+1)
)}
(1.3)
> max
Cit
{
U(Cit) + βVt+1
(
(Yit − Cit)
(
1 + ψ∗itr
ce
s,i,t+1 + (1− ψ∗it)rz,t+1
))}
,
which will only occur if rces,i,t+1 is sufficiently smaller than rz,t+1. Thus, fixed transac-
tion costs impose an entry barrier for current non-participants and an exit barrier for
current participants. This makes it more likely that households will not change their
participation status between period t− 1 and period t, which induces first-order state
dependence in the participation decision, i.e. current participation is positively cor-
related with past participation. Testing for positive state dependence in households’
securities holdings could therefore provide a sufficient justification for the existence of
pecuniary transaction costs (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002a).
1.2.2 Habit Persistence
Pecuniary trading costs, however, are not the only possible explanation for state de-
pendence in securities market participation decisions. Habit persistence would also
yield behavior that was consistent with first-order state dependence in the participa-
tion decision.
Habit persistence might stem from household specific historical characteristics that
adapt only slowly over time. If a household is used to put money aside in a savings
book, it might continue in this pattern and refrain from investing in risky securities
even if monetary costs do not impose any barrier. Reluctance to rebalance the portfolio
could also result from differences in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which
is closely linked to the degree of risk aversion through the parameter ρ in a utility
function with constant relative risk aversion U(Cit) =
C1−ρit −1
1−ρ . Much evidence docu-
ments significant heterogeneity in this elasticity (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002b). Empirical
studies point out that households refrain from rebalancing their portfolios in each pe-
riod. Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli (2002) report that, conditional upon ownership, the
age profile of asset shares is nearly flat in most countries. This indicates that people
do not rebalance their wealth portfolio very frequently. Ameriks and Zeldes (2001)
find that, in spite of different professional advice and in contrast to standard portfolio
choice models, most households choose a particular portfolio of assets and stick to it
even when their circumstances change. Similar observations have been reported by
Tearing Down the Wall 13
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).
1.2.3 Investment Experience
Another cause of state dependence in participation decisions could arise from increasing
financial sophistication of investors. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007, 2009) show
that wealthy and educated Swedish investors outperform the market by 4.3 percent
and diversify more actively into risky assets. Similarly, Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden
(2003) document that the wealthy and educated own a larger share of risky assets and
rebalance their retirement accounts more actively. While wealth and education proxy
the investor’s degree of financial literacy, these measures exclude the possibility that
ownership experiences could also foster investors’ financial sophistication. To the best
of my knowledge, no study has so far been able to account for the full ownership history
of households.
The East German data allow me to distinguish two different channels through
which ownership experiences could affect participation. First, I control for the number
of years a household owned securities, which is a measure for asset-specific learning.
Alessie, Hochguertel, van Soest (2004) argue that asset-specific learning may increase
familiarity and awareness of the risk and return characteristics of the assets one owns.
Also, Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) shows that experienced investors are less likely to over-
estimate stock returns and are more cautious with regard to inflation forecasts. This
indicates that individual investment experience is likely to affect estimates of rces,i,t+1.
If the accuracy of return expectations increases with the experience of the investor,
experienced households will be less likely to leave the market due to false expectations.
In line with this idea, Agarwal et al. (2008) estimate that the quality of financial
decision-making is a concave function of age with a peak at an age of 53.
The second measure adds up the market returns for the years in which a household
owned securities, which proxies the macro-experience with asset markets that each
household made over its life-cycle. King and Leape (1987) point out that the presence
of age and cohort patterns, which are typical for household portfolios, might be due to
the fact that households accumulate information about investment opportunities over
time. Malmendier and Nagel (2007) show that people who grew up during a time of
bear markets are less likely to invest into risky assets over their life-cycle. For risk
averse households, rces,i,t+1 is smaller than the expected net return of the risky portfolio
E
(
ψitrs,i,t+1+ (1−ψit)rz,t+1
)
. Thus, risk averse households will underestimate the cer-
tainty equivalent return of the risky portfolio and stay out of the market for subsequent
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periods. Not controlling for such experience effects could thus induce state dependence
in the estimates that does not stem from pure trading costs.
The essential implication of the above reasoning is that both monetary as well as
non-monetary transaction costs would cause state dependence in ownership decisions.
The theoretical considerations suggest the following strategy to quantify the impor-
tance of each type of costs. First, I explain participation in the securities market by
estimating probit regressions with a binary dependent variable, which is unity if a
households owns one or more securities in a given year and zero otherwise. Using a
standard dynamic random effects model, I then test for state dependence in the partic-
ipation decision. Second, I compare this estimate with an estimate from a regression
that also controls for habit persistence (or investment experience). If the new esti-
mate is significantly smaller than before, this would suggest that state dependence is
rather caused by habit persistence (or investment experience) than by pecuniary trans-
action costs. Finally, I compare both estimates to a regression that controls for habit
persistence as well as investment experience.
1.3 Identification Strategy
For identification, I rely crucially on three features of the institutional environment in
East Germany. First, I reason that each household’s individual ownership experience
can be observed. Second, I argue that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with
initial securities ownership. Third, I assume that the explanatory variables are weakly
exogenous to the participation decision, allowing a causal interpretation of the esti-
mates.
A unique feature of East German portfolios is that the full ownership history of
each household can be tracked down. In 1990, households of all age groups without
any prior experience were confronted with securities for the first time. At the macro
level, age and cohort patterns should therefore not reflect any experience effects, be-
cause everybody faced the same market conditions during his life under a capitalist
system. Trends that are common to all investors will be captured via year dummies.
At the individual level, however, there might be strong effects from macro-experiences,
depending on whether investments were made during a good or a bad year on the
market.
Second, I do not face the initial conditions problem common to dynamic binary
choice models, as securities ownership was not possible before reunification. East Ger-
mans could only put their money aside in savings accounts, savings books and life
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insurance with a unitary interest rate of 3.25% (Dabbert, 1992; Schwarzer, 1999). Pri-
vate ownership of companies was barred. Although transitional ownership was not
forbidden until 1972, private ownership during this period typically included the state
as shareholder. Similarly, bond markets did not develop in the GDR due to limited
issuing as well as a unitary interest rate. Foreign investments were blocked because
borders between the GDR and the West were closed from 1961 onward. Hence, a new
data generating process started with German reunification in 1990.
Finally, most lifetime decisions were made under the communist system, so that
post-reunification incomes are sufficiently exogenous to the participation decision. In
the GDR, incomes of university graduates were only 15 percent higher than those of
blue-collar workers, compared to 70 percent in West Germany. Sectoral wage differ-
ences were also very low, and full employment was constitutionally guaranteed (Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005). Additionally, educational choices were restricted by
state intervention. Only a certain quota of students was permitted to attend the last
two years of high school, which were necessary to enter university. Access to higher
education required membership in the GDR youth organization (FDJ ), and political
opinions in accordance with official party positions. Children from working class fam-
ilies had preferential access. Based on these circumstances, I draw two conclusions.
First, the financial rewards for different qualifications in the reunified country were not
taken into account when career decision were made. Second, self-selection into careers
with low risks concerning income fluctuations is unlikely, given the small income dif-
ferences and the absence of unemployment risks. Thus, educational and occupational
characteristics of households are not likely to be correlated with their preferences for
risky assets.
1.4 Empirical Models
In this section, I introduce the benchmark dynamic discrete-choice model for panel
data with time-constant random effects, which has been widely used in the literature,
e.g. Miniaci and Weber (2002). I then proceed to introduce time-varying heterogeneity
in this model, which is theoretically more convincing, because it allows to disentangle
true state dependence from habit persistence in unobserved preferences. The empirical
part in section 1.6 will also show that, empirically, persistence in unobserved effects is
the preferred assumption.
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1.4.1 Dynamic Random Effects Probit
Let S∗it denote a latent variable which represents the desired level of risky securities of
household i = 1, . . . , N at time t = 1, . . . , T . Even if the desired level of risky assets
is not known, the probability of securities market participation Pr(Sit = 1) can be
estimated, where
Sit =
1 if S∗it > 00 if S∗it ≤ 0. (1.4)
Assuming that participation is independent over time, the joint probability is given by
Pr(Si1, . . . , SiT ) =
∏T
t=1 Pr(Sit). Under these assumptions, participation probabilities
could be studied using standard cross-section discrete choice models. However, the
independence assumption fails in presence of state dependence, which implies that the
probability of participation is higher for previous participants than non-participants,
i.e. Pr(Sit = 1|Si,t−1 = 1) > Pr(Sit = 1|Si,t−1 = 0) 6= Pr(Sit). As the presence
of pecuniary transaction costs would suggest that past ownership modifies behavior
today, a dynamic specification is needed:
S∗it = γSi,t−1 + xitβ + ci + ²it, (1.5)
where ci is an unobserved time-invariant individual effect and ²it an i.i.d. error term.
xit is a vector of strictly exogenous variables, xi = (xi1, . . . , xiT ). In order to test for
true state dependence, it is important to control for the individual effect ci, because
even if the true γ = 0, Pr(Sit = 1|Si,t−1,xi) 6= Pr(Sit = 1|xi) due to the presence of ci.
In short panels, there is also the well-known initial conditions problem due to the
need to integrate out ci in order to approximate the joint distribution f(Si|xi, ci), where
Si = (Si1, . . . , SiT ). Several approaches are available to deal with the initial conditions,
e.g. Heckman (1981), Wooldridge (2005), Honore´ and Tamer (2006). However, in this
application, a new process starts with the first sampling period in 1990. This will
greatly facilitate modeling the autocorrelation structure of the errors compared to, for
instance, Hyslop (1999), who estimates an AR(1)-RE model in the context of labor
market participation. Hence, the distribution of ci is independent of the initial value
Si0 (which is zero for all individuals),
g(ci|xi, Si0) = g(ci|xi). (1.6)
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I relax the assumption that (Si1, . . . , SiT ) are independent conditional on (xi, ci) using
a Mundlak (1978) specification of the random effect
ci|xi ∼ N(δ0 + xiδ1, σ2), (1.7)
where σ2 is the conditional variance of ci. While maintaining the strict exogeneity
assumption on xit conditional on ci, this specification allows for correlation between
ci and the average xi. Two features of the Mundlak specification should be noted.
First, all time dummies must be dropped from (1.7) and a constant may only appear
in (1.7) to avoid collinearity. Second, the coefficients of time-invariant regressors are a
composite of the relevant elements of (β + δ1) and cannot be separately identified.
3
1.4.2 Dynamic Random Effects Probit with an AR(1) Error
Component
To see why state dependence might be caused by persistence in unobserved effects,
consider the same model as before, yet with time-varying (cit) instead of time-constant
(ci) individual heterogeneity
S∗it = γSi,t−1 + xitβ + cit + ²it. (1.8)
Assume the AR(1) structure for the unobserved characteristics
cit = ρci,t−1 + ait, (1.9)
where ait|xi ∼ N(δ0+xiδ1, (1−ρ2)σ2), following the Mundlak specification above. Due
to the discrete and continuous nature of Si,t−1 and ci,t−1 respectively, this specification
of the correlation structure across time assures that γ and ρ are identified. Note that
this model corresponds to a random effects model with ci = cit for all t in the case
of ρ = 1, and a standard probit model if σ = 0. The correlation between cit and cis
conditional on xi is ρ
|t−s|. In presence of (decaying) habit persistence, it follows that
Pr(Sit = 1|Si,t−1,xi, ci) 6= Pr(Si,t|xi, ci) as long as 0 < ρ < 1, even if the true γ = 0.
Thus a probit model with time-constant random effects does not allow studying true
3Chamberlain (1980) allowed for a more flexible specification by using the vector of all explanatory
variables across all time periods xi instead of xi. I prefer the Mundlak (1978) specification, as it
conserves on parameters. However, the model does not specify a complete model for the unobserved
effects and may therefore be sensitive to misspecification. Both approaches are identical if δ11 = · · · =
δ1T.
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state dependence if persistence in individual (unobserved) effects can be suspected.
Integrating out the full latent process ci1, . . . , ciT , the likelihood contribution of the
observations on cross-sectional unit i = 1, . . . , N for the model in (1.8) and (1.9) can
be written as
Li = Pr(Si|xi, Si,t−1) = Pr(Si1|xi)Pr(Si2|xi, Si1) . . . P r(SiT |xi, Si1, . . . , Si,T−1) (1.10)
=
∫
. . .
∫ ( T∏
t=1
Pr(Sit|xi, Si,t−1, cit)
)
g(ci1, . . . , cit|xi)dci1 . . . ciT ,
since Si0 = 0. Although this T-dimensional integral does in general not have an analytic
solution, it can be approximated numerically using simulation techniques, which yield
a consistent estimator if the number of replications R rises sufficiently with N (Ha-
jivassiliou and Ruud, 1994). While this holds asymptotically, Lee (1997) shows that
the accuracy given a finite number of replications often worsens with the dimension
of the integral. Given the high time-series dimension of the data here (T = 17), joint
simulation over the T-dimensional integral cannot be expected to work well. There-
fore, I apply Heiss’ (2008) random effects estimator, which reduces the dimensionality
via a sequential nonlinear Kalman-filter. Based on (1.10), the outcome probabilities
conditional on past values are approximated at each t for the one-dimensional integral
Pr∗it ≈ Pr(Sit|xi, Si1, . . . , Si,T−1) =
∫
Pr(Sit|xi, Si,t−1, cit)g(cit|xi, Si1, . . . , Si,T−1)dcit.
(1.11)
Sequentially approximating (1.11) for all t = 1, . . . , T and updating of the conditional
probability distribution function g∗(ci,t+1|xi, Si1, . . . , Si,T−1) now allows to approximate
the joint likelihood contribution Pr(Si|xi, Si,t−1) = Pr∗i1Pr∗i2 . . . P r∗iT . The outcome
probability in the first time period, Pr(Si1|xi) is estimated unconditionally of past
values of Sit. This approximation is consistent, because the initial conditions can
be neglected here. For details of the algorithm, see Heiss (2007). Gauss-Hermite
quadrature with 30 nodes is used for simulations. Sensitivity of the results to the
choice of nodes is checked for both models.
In order to estimate the average partial effects of this non-linear estimator, it is
necessary to calculate the average partial effect over the distribution of individual
heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). For given values of xt = x
0 and St−1 = S0−1, the
average partial effects for the model with time-constant heterogeneity, E[E[Φ(γS0−1 +
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x0β + ci)|xi]], can be estimated by
1
N
N∑
i=1
Φ
(
(1 + σˆ2)−
1
2 (γˆS0−1 + x
0βˆ + δˆ0 + xiδˆ0)
)
. (1.12)
Using iterated expectations with respect to the distribution of cit for the model with
time-varying heterogeneity E[E[Φ(γS0−1+x
0β+cit)|xi, ci,t−1]], the average partial effect
can be consistently estimated by
1
N
N∑
i=1
Φ
(
(1 + (1− ρˆ2)σˆ2)− 12 (γˆS0−1 + x0βˆ + δˆ0 + xiδˆ0)
)
. (1.13)
1.5 The Data
The data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), which is a longitu-
dinal survey of private households in Germany.4 The subsample covering the territory
of the former GDR started in 1990 and contains 1988 initial responses. As I am in-
terested in dynamic behavior, I only use those observations for which data is available
for all 17 years. Due to attrition, this leaves me with 1078 East German households
that are observed from 1990 to 2007. At the end of section 1.6, I report results of tests
for systematic attrition, but cannot find any evidence for selection bias. If questions
are not at the household level, I use information about the household head (e.g. age,
education).5
Each year households are asked about the assets in their savings portfolio. The ques-
tion reads: ”Did you or any other person in your household possess one or more of the
following investments last year? a) savings book, b) savings agreement with building
society, c) life insurance, d) securities [stocks, bonds, mortgage bonds,. . . ], e) business
capital, f) no, none of these investments.” These variables are one if households hold a
certain asset, and zero otherwise. Two things are noteworthy about response category
d) of this question. First, the question gives information about security holdings in
general, while detailed information about bond and stock holdings cannot be inferred.
Similar to Guiso, Japelli, Terlizzese (1996), I therefore define security holdings as a
4The Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for ex-
tracting the data. See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO
file to retrieve the data used here is available from me upon request. Any data or computational errors
are my own.
5The GSOEP is the only panel data set that allows to study East German households over time.
The Bundesbank Income and Consumer Survey (EVS) is only conducted every five years for a cross-
section of households. For a comparison of both surveys, see Bo¨rsch-Supan and Eymann (2002).
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broad set of risky assets, compared to save investments such as savings books, building
society contracts, or life insurance. Only from 2001 onward, the questionnaire asks for
bond and stock holdings separately. Second, the information is reported with a one
year lag. So the 1990 survey asked for securities holdings in 1989. Although individuals
could not legally own securities in the GDR, 13 households actually reported to do so
in 1989. However, these positive responses are likely to be erroneous, since only two of
these households indicated to hold securities a year later (which might also be newly
bought securities). I therefore set all observations before 1990 to zero.
Starting with zero security holdings in 1990, figure 1.1 depicts that ownership rates
adjusted very quickly to those in West Germany. From 1993 onward, ownership rates
in East and West Germany move parallel, although they are lower in the East probably
due to higher unemployment risk and lower average incomes. Similar to other indus-
trialized countries ownership increased during the 1990s. In the East German case,
the main explanatory factors for this increase might be portfolio adjustments after re-
unification, increases in real income, and the three waves of privatization of Deutsche
Telekom (1996, 1999, 2000), which boosted stock market participation among average
households. After the burst of the dotcom bubble, ownership rates did slightly decay
to 31% in 2006. In addition, figure 1.1 depicts that stocks made up about 2/3 of all
securities investments since 2000. This indicates that those households reporting to
hold securities indeed had much riskier portfolios than those relying on savings books.6
The GSOEP does not provide information with regard to portfolio composition.
The only available time series data that give an indication of portfolio shares across
different assets are from the Bundesbank (2008), which reports the allocation of pri-
vate wealth in Germany. Table 1.1 reports the total wealth invested into different asset
classes between 1991 and 2006 in Germany. There is a clear trend that less and less
wealth is held in savings books and savings accounts, although 33.2% of private German
wealth was still held on savings accounts in 2006. Particularly, investments in securities
increased strongly from 29.2% in 1991 to 35.0% in 2006, but also life insurance and
pension funds became more and more important during the 1990s. Among securities,
the share of wealth invested in savings certificates fell from 17.0% in 1991 to 4.7% in
2006. Similarly, bonds became less attractive. Stock ownership peaked around 2000,
whereas mutual funds account for the largest share among securities in 2006 (33.3%).
Each households’ accumulated ownership experience is calculated at each point in
time as the one-period lagged sum of years during which the household owned securi-
6German banking laws require mandatory insurance of deposits. For Sparkassen (public savings
banks), which administer a large share of private savings, deposit insurance is unlimited. But also
most private banks take part in voluntary guarantee schemes, which implicates for the average investor
that all of his deposits are secure.
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ties, i.e. expit =
∑t
τ=1 Si,τ−1. Using the lagged sum is particularly convenient, because
it ensures that expit is uncorrelated with the unobserved preference for holding securi-
ties, given that lagged ownership and persistence in unobserved preferences are control
for. Table 1.1 presents the total ownership experience that the households in the sam-
ple gained during the period from 1990 to 2006. Although 14 households held securities
in every year since reunification, the majority of households gained no more than two
years of experience. 32.6% of all households did not participate at all, which is in stark
contrast to standard lifetime portfolio choice models.
The second proxy for investment experience builds on the work by Malmendier and
Nagel (2007), who calculate the average return history of the stock market during each
investor’s lifetime. Yet age-related returns differentials should be insignificant in East
Germany, since all households accumulated the same macro-experience after reunifi-
cation. Rather, returns should matter for those years in which a household owned
securities. The macro-return experience of household i is therefore defined as
rexpit =
exp( 1expit
∑t
τ=1 ln(1 + Si,τ−1
∑K
k=1wk,τ−1Rk,τ−1)− 1) if expit > 0
0 if expit = 0.
wk is the share of asset k = {Stocks,Bonds} in total annual savings, as calculated
from table 1.1. Average annual returns on stocks and bonds, Rk, are taken from the
Bundesbank, which provides data on the performance of the DAX stock market index
as well as average interest rates on savings deposits in Germany.
To get an impression of the average ownership duration, figure 1.2 depicts the av-
erage share of new entrants in a given year who invest into securities for at least the
three following years. As expected, investment duration is longer if households enter
before markets surge. However, households who entered at the peak of the DAX index
in 2000 have similar investment durations as those entering during the previous years.
One reason could be that many unexperienced investors, which entered in 2000, hoped
they could recover their losses due to the dotcom crash. The share of long-term in-
vestors has declined since then.
In figure 1.3, market returns are combined with individual investment durations.
Although this does not provide information on individual returns, it gives an indication
of the average returns that households experienced. For each year, the figure depicts
the average market return that market entrants experienced, given the duration of
their investment. For instance, a household that entered in 1999 experienced market
returns of around -10 percent, given the average investment duration. Thus, the figure
rejects the idea that households benefited from the equity premium, because investors
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that entered during bullish market years did not have the stamina to invest for long
enough as to materialize potential long-run gains.
Table 1.2 presents annual transition dynamics and table 1.3 transitions between
1995 and 2005. This gives a partial view of changes in securities holdings, as only
transitions of households that sell all their securities or enter the securities market are
shown. Table 1.2 reads as follows. Of those households not holding securities last
period, 89.5% do also not hold securities this period, whereas 10.5% bought securities.
Persistence among those who owned securities last period is very high (77.2%). Yet the
exit rate (22.8%) is higher than the entry rate (10.5%). Similarly, table 1.3 reports that
67.6% of those owning securities in 1995 also participated in 2005. Both tables show
that households change their investment choices relatively infrequently. It is unlikely
that such long-term persistence can be explained with state dependence from year to
year only. Rather, there might be persistence in unobserved household preferences over
time.
Figure 1.4 depicts the annual share of households that enter and those that stay out
of the market. Households that enter had no securities last period but hold securities
this period. The entry rate is around 10% during the entire period, except for a jump
in 2000. Similarly, the share of those staying out is relatively high, which indicates
reluctance to change the status quo (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2001). On the other hand,
a declining exit rate is the main reason for the observed increase in ownership rates
during the 1990s (figure 1). This also indicates strong habit persistence among house-
holds, because state dependence alone would not lead to declining exit rates.
Figure 1.5 reports (head of household) age and cohort patterns for securities own-
ership rates. I use 5-year intervals to define age-in-1990 cohorts with an initial age
between 18 and 25 in 1990 for the youngest cohort, and those older than 75 for the old-
est cohort. The figure gives raw ownership rates for the unbalanced panel of all cohorts
in all waves. Each cohort curve consists of 17 points that indicate the average age and
ownership rate at the time of the interview. While all cohorts have zero holdings in
1989, ownership rates in 1990 start already at different levels. These jumps between
cohort curves indicate that there are age and/or cohort effects. Specifically, cohorts
aged 55 and older at reunification have a very distinct ownership pattern compared
to younger cohorts. Ownership rates seem to oscillate around a flat average. This
indicates presence of cohort and time effects, but potential absence of age effects for
the older cohorts. Yet there are age and/or time effects among the younger cohorts, as
their cohort curves are not horizontal. However, age, cohort, and time effects cannot
be identified without further assumptions.
Summary statistics of additional covariates are reported in table 1.4. Based on the
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annual income distributions, I partition household incomes into five quintiles (taking
the poorest quintile as the reference category). In theory, non-financial income could
affect securities ownership positively as well as negatively, depending on the correlation
between securities returns and non-financial income. Specifically, perfect correlation
between both would allow to perfectly hedge non-financial income streams. In prac-
tice, however, German households do not invest a significant amount of wealth into
derivatives (see table 1.1), so that a positive effect can be suspected. With regard
to financial income, I construct a measure of financial wealth based on the question:
”How high was the income from interest and dividends in the last year, all in all? (If
not known exactly, please estimate the amount using this list: a) less than 500 DM, b)
500 to 2000 DM, c) 2000 to 5000 DM, d) 5000 to 10000 DM, e) 10000 DM and over.)”
Due to potential endogeneity, I use lagged financial wealth and include this covariate
only for sensitivity checks. Additional control variables for the household head include
age, martial status, labor force status, education, dummies for the number of children
(one, two, or more than two), and an indicator for house ownership.
1.6 Estimation Results
Before moving on to the estimation results, it is worth remembering that the high
persistence in participation has so far almost exclusively been modeled as either time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity and/or state dependence. Table 1.6 gives an im-
pression of the intertemporal correlation pattern over several years. The ownership
decision is modeled as a function of socio-economic characteristics of the household as
well as lagged participation outcomes. Most strikingly, the coefficients of all lags are
significantly different from zero and get smaller the higher the order of the lag. This ob-
servation contrasts to the assumptions of the models that have been used so far. First,
a random effects model would imply equal predictive power of all lags, which cannot
be confirmed by the estimates. Second, a model that exhibits state dependence in the
participation decision would imply that, after controlling for the first lag, all other lags
have no significant predictive power. This is in contradiction to the estimates. Finally,
the combination of state dependence with a (time-constant) random effects framework
would imply higher predictive power of the first lag and equal predictive power of the
other lags. However, a Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that lags two to five
have equal predictive power with a χ2-statistic of 48.42 (0.000).
These results indicate that the models that are commonly used to study ownership
decisions cannot sufficiently capture the correlation structure in the data. As long as
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habit persistence and investment experience are not controlled for, the lagged depen-
dent variable picks up different sources of intertemporal correlation in the standard
random effects dynamic probit model. In order to see how large this bias is, it will be
helpful to compare estimates from a random effects model with time-constant hetero-
geneity to those from a random effects model that explicitly models habit persistence
and/or controls for experience effects.
The estimates reported in table 1.7 show that the random effects specifications
with time-varying heterogeneity are clearly preferred to their time-constant alterna-
tives. The estimated ρ in columns (3) and (5) is clearly different from 1.7 Also, a
likelihood ratio test on the full vector of parameters rejects the hypothesis that model
(2) is preferred to model (3). Similarly, model (4) is rejected against (5). Moreover, the
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria favor those specifications that allow for au-
tocorrelation in the error term. According to both criteria, the preferred specification
is (5), which allows for state dependence, habit persistence and controls for investment
experiences. As xi is jointly significant, a Mundlak specification is needed to account
for correlation between random effects and covariates in oder to get unbiased estimates
of β. In all specifications, the lagged dependent variable is strongly significant, sub-
stantiating the view that monetary transaction costs cause true state dependence in
participation decisions. However, the estimated degree of state dependence varies con-
siderably between different specifications.
Table 1.8 reports average partial effects of the degree of state dependence. I es-
timate that last period participants have a 28.5 percentage points higher probability
of participating in the current period, than those that did not participate last period.
This estimate is of similar size as those of other (time-constant) random effects specifi-
cations, e.g. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) or Alessie, Hochguertel, van Soest (2004). Yet
once I allow for habit persistence, the estimated degree of state dependence falls to
only 8 percentage points in model (3) (5.2 percentage points if experience is controlled
for too). So the estimated degree of state dependence is only three quarters as large
as in the case of time-constant heterogeneity. The reason for this huge difference is
that the correlation of the error term appears to decay over time (table 1.6). But
specifications (2) and (4) constrain the random effect to be constant, so that the lag
of the dependent variable takes up all autocorrelation. Once this restrictive assump-
tion on the random effect is relaxed, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
only captures the pecuniary transaction costs effect. The degree of habit persistence
in model (5) is ρˆ = 0.86, which corresponds to a persistence of 0.8617 = 8.5% of the
initial preferences till 2006.
7The necessary test is to compare arctan(ρ) = 15 against the alternative that arctan(ρ) 6= 15.
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In contrast to Agarwal et al. (2008), Malmendier and Nagel (2007), and Ameriks
and Zeldes (2001), who take age and cohort effects as an indication for the importance
of investment experience in portfolio choices, I find little evidence for pronounced age
and cohort patterns. This is in accordance with the fact that all households started off
with zero investment experience in 1990. However, the accumulated ownership expe-
rience has a strong impact on subsequent investment decisions. Table 1.8 reports for
specification (5) that one year of ownership experience increases the probability to in-
vest into securities by 4 percentage points on average. This strong impact corroborates
the idea that asset-specific learning affects households’ savings decisions. However,
macro-experiences, as captured by rexpit, are insignificant in all specifications. This
calls into doubt that the market returns that individuals experience over their life-cycle
affect their risk taking behavior.
Table 1.8 also reports average partial effects of non-financial income on participa-
tion. In specification (5), households in the top income quintile have a 4.0 percentage
points higher probability of staying in the market than those in the bottom quintile,
supporting the view that entry costs are less important for richer households (Vissing-
Jørgensen, 2003).
In table 1.9, I also allow for nonlinear terms of expit and rexpit and test in how
far financial wealth affects the participation decision. Models (6) and (7) indicate the
presence of diminishing returns to ownership experience. rexpit is still insignificant.
The wealth dummies are neither individually nor jointly significant, but their averages
are. These findings are in line with Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), who show that
changes in wealth do not affect the risk taking behavior of households in the PSID.
While my estimates also reject that changes in wealth affect participation, they indi-
cate that the degree of risk aversion is related to lifetime financial wealth.
I also check the sensitivity of the estimates to expectations about financial and
employment risks. In each year, household heads are asked if they are severely worried
about their own financial situation. In 27% of the responses there was indication of
financial worries, which might also be a sign of borrowing constraints among these
households. Similarly, 16% of the respondents indicated that they were severely wor-
ried about the security of their jobs. However, both variables do not significantly
explain participation, which gives me confidence that my specification yields unbiased
estimates.
Finally, I test for potential attrition bias by applying an inverse probability weighted
(IPW) pooled probit estimator (Wooldridge, 2002).8 To implement this estimator I di-
8An IPW estimator cannot be applied to random effects models. However, the partial maximum
likelihood properties of the pooled probit estimator imply that differences to random effects estimates
Tearing Down the Wall 26
vide all initial respondents into those that participated in each survey until 2007 (the
balanced sample) and those that dropped out earlier. Given the initial characteristics
of the household and its participation status in 1990, I estimate a probit model for
being in the balanced sample and compute inverse probability weights for each obser-
vation. This regression includes an additional dummy indicating politically interested
households. As required in a selection on observables approach, this indicator is signif-
icantly correlated with the probability to participate in the survey repeatedly as well
as the probability to own securities (Fitzgerald, 1998). Unweighted estimates from a
pooled probit model for the participation decision can then be compared to estimates
from an IPW probit, as reported in table 1.10. The estimates show that attrition does
not impose a severe problem. Particularly, the coefficients of the lagged dependent
variable as well as the experience dummies show little difference between unweighted
and IPW regressions.
1.7 Conclusion
The widespread non-participation in securities markets is one of the most surprising
puzzles of standard portfolio theory. I analyze portfolio decisions of East German
households after German reunification. A descriptive analysis documents that (i) only
few households in the sample own risky assets between 1990 and 2006, (ii) most house-
holds change their portfolios infrequently, and (iii) increases in ownership rates during
the 1990s are mainly due to fewer exits, while the percentage of new entries remains
relatively constant over the entire period. These stylized facts indicate that household
behavior exhibits a high degree of persistence that cannot merely be explained by state
dependence from year to year.
Compared to previous attempts to study dynamic participation behavior in secu-
rities markets, the peculiar institutional environment in East Germany offers several
advantages. First, I can estimate the effect of investors’ financial sophistication from
their newly gained investment experience on participation dynamics, since households
of all age groups had no prior experience with securities in 1990. This allows me to
disentangle habit persistence and investment experience from pecuniary transaction
costs motives in participation decisions. Second, the initial conditions of this dynamic
process are truly exogenous thanks to the fact that markets for securities did not exist
in the former GDR.
I find that habit persistence and lack of investment experience are the main reasons
are, asymptotically, negligible.
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for the observed non-participation, whereas the importance of pecuniary transaction
costs has been largely overestimated in past studies. In other words, East Germans’
tastes for risky assets developed only slowly over time. Contrary to Malmendier and
Nagel (2007), Agarwal et al. (2008), and King and Leape (1987), who take age and
cohort patterns as an indication for the importance of life-cycle effects in risk prefer-
ences, there is little evidence that past market returns affect investment decisions of
East German households (for which the full ownership history is known). Similarly,
changes in financial wealth do not affect risk taking behavior, which is in contrast to
theory (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008), whereas average wealth levels impact invest-
ment choices.
However, the data do not allow an analysis of the welfare consequences of non-
participation, as I only observe participation choices. Based on Swedish data, Calvet,
Campbell, and Sodini (2007) estimate that poor and poorly educated households would
potentially invest in underperforming assets. This could explain why they prefer to
abstain from stock markets altogether. In contrast to Sweden, where 62 percent of
households own stocks, only 20.4 percent do so in East Germany. It is thus unlikely
that education and income alone could explain such rampant non-participation sixteen
years after reunification. Additionally, the peculiar environment in East Germany pro-
vides an ideal natural experiment to study participation behavior. Yet the findings
have a wider applicability, since inertia in investment decisions have been documented
for several countries. Also, participation in the East is similar to West Germany, albeit
at a lower level due to inexperience with securities, different preferences, lower incomes,
and higher unemployment risks in the East.
The findings are essential for understanding portfolio choices of households in gen-
eral. It has been argued that the non-participation puzzle is closely related to the
equity premium puzzle, since the correlation between consumption and stock returns
is higher for stockholders than for non-stockholders (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002b). Yet
the theoretical literature has so far mainly focused on habit persistence in consump-
tion patterns, e.g. Constantinides (1990), Møller (2009). The incorporation of habit
formation in households’ preferences for risky assets may help to explain the equity
premium in life-cycle portfolio choice models.
My results are particularly relevant for policy-makers and financial consultants
seeking to establish household portfolios as an additional pillar of the social security
system. In order to increase the acceptance of private savings plans, they will have to
override households’ habit persistence and reservation with regard to risky assets. Once
they have overcome these inhibitions, households are likely to take advantage of the
full range of available assets to put aside their savings. Hence, my results strengthen
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the case for policies such as default options, which do not require people to opt in
but rather allow opting out of private retirement savings schemes. This conclusion
differs from previous studies in so far as they argued that non-participation is merely
a rational response to high entry costs. However, the East German experience demon-
strates that it is primarily the wall in people’s minds to adopt to new circumstances,
which explains non-participation behavior. This is what is truly puzzling about the
non-participation puzzle.
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Figure 1.1: The graph depicts securities ownership rates between 1989-2006. Author’s calculation
based on GSOEP.
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Figure 1.2: The graph depicts the average share of new entrants in a given year who invest into
securities for at least the three following years. Author’s calculation based on GSOEP.
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Figure 1.3: The graph depicts the average market return, which entrants in a a given year experi-
enced given the length of their investment. Author’s calculation based on GSOEP.
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Table 1.2: Annual transitions
as % of all observations
Sit = 0 Sit = 1
Si,t−1 = 0 89.52 10.48
Si,t−1 = 1 22.84 77.16
Total 71.5 28.5
Table 1.3: Transitions: 1995 - 2005
Si,2005 = 0 Si,2005 = 1
Si,1995 = 0 76.68 23.32
Si,1995 = 1 32.38 67.62
Total 66.35 33.65
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Table 1.4: Experience in securities markets
Years of Frequency Percent Cumulative
Experience
0 351 32.56 32.56
1 123 11.41 43.97
2 75 6.96 50.93
3 64 5.94 56.86
4 41 3.8 60.67
5 44 4.08 64.75
6 42 3.9 68.65
7 46 4.27 72.91
8 36 3.34 76.25
9 35 3.25 79.5
10 28 2.6 82.1
11 36 3.34 85.44
12 28 2.6 88.03
13 32 2.97 91
14 36 3.34 94.34
15 26 2.41 96.75
16 21 1.95 98.7
17 14 1.3 100
Total 1,078 100
Note: Experience is constructed as the total number
of years during which households owned securities
between 1990 and 2006.
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
St 17179 0.274 0.445 0 1
St−1 17179 0.255 0.435 0 1
Hhold income 20%-40% 17179 0.197 0.398 0 1
Hhold income 40%-60% 17179 0.222 0.416 0 1
Hhold income 60%-80% 17179 0.216 0.411 0 1
Hhold income 80%+ 17179 0.221 0.415 0 1
one child 17179 0.179 0.383 0 1
two children 17179 0.133 0.339 0 1
three children+ 17179 0.036 0.186 0 1
married 17179 0.925 0.263 0 1
owns house 17179 0.375 0.484 0 1
unemployed 17179 0.120 0.325 0 1
age/10 17179 5.121 1.359 1.9 9.3
(age/10)2 17179 28.073 14.457 3.6 86.5
cohort 25-35 17179 0.273 0.445 0 1
cohort 35-45 17179 0.228 0.419 0 1
cohort 45-55 17179 0.249 0.433 0 1
cohort 55-65 17179 0.149 0.356 0 1
cohort 65+ 17179 0.0592 0.236 0 1
retiree 17179 0.302 0.459 0 1
10 years schooling 17179 0.451 0.498 0 1
13 years schooling 17179 0.181 0.385 0 1
college 17179 0.198 0.399 0 1
university 17179 0.128 0.334 0 1
dividendst−1 500-2000 16192 0.259 0.438 0 1
dividendst−1 2000-5000 16192 0.079 0.270 0 1
dividendst−1 5000-10000 16192 0.027 0.161 0 1
dividendst−1 10000+ 16192 0.009 0.093 0 1
financial worries 17118 0.269 0.443 0 1
job worries 16724 0.160 0.367 0 1
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Table 1.6: RE with higher order lags
(1)
β se
St−1 1.273*** (0.038)
St−2 0.578*** (0.041)
St−3 0.400*** (0.043)
St−4 0.281*** (0.045)
St−5 0.179*** (0.045)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.153* (0.077)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.172* (0.082)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.233** (0.086)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.281** (0.091)
one child 0.124 (0.064)
two children 0.093 (0.090)
three children+ 0.338* (0.161)
married 0.013 (0.175)
owns house -0.009 (0.073)
unemployed -0.011 (0.061)
age/10 0.003 (0.168)
(age/10)2 -0.003 (0.015)
cohort 25-35 -0.081 (0.101)
cohort 35-45 -0.066 (0.141)
cohort 45-55 0.091 (0.186)
cohort 55-65 0.002 (0.227)
cohort 65+ -0.020 (0.289)
retiree -0.084 (0.059)
10 years schooling 0.122** (0.044)
13 years schooling 0.203** (0.064)
College 0.058 (0.041)
University 0.011 (0.064)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.071 (0.144)
Hhold income 40%− 60% 0.244 (0.132)
Hhold income 60%− 80% 0.394** (0.139)
Hhold income > 80% 0.497*** (0.135)
one child -0.274* (0.113)
two children -0.185 (0.130)
three children+ -0.942*** (0.219)
married -0.196 (0.188)
owns house 0.055 (0.085)
unemployed -0.196 (0.130)
constant -1.923*** (0.440)
ln(σˆ2) -5.967*** (-0.124)
N 12709
χ2 5006.5
AIC 8509.5
BIC 8889.5
Note: The dependent variable is one if a household
owns one or more securities and zero otherwise. Time
dummies are suppressed.
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Table 1.7: Estimates from standard RE and AR(1)-RE models.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
RE AR(1)-RE RE AR(1)-RE
β se β se β se β se
St−1 1.191*** (0.036) 0.482*** (0.092) 1.177*** (0.037) 0.342*** (0.103)
exp 0.075*** (0.011) 0.215*** (0.029)
rexp -0.137 (0.228) 0.161 (0.386)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.180* (0.071) 0.240* (0.102) 0.171* (0.069) 0.247* (0.107)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.230** (0.075) 0.313** (0.111) 0.221** (0.072) 0.326** (0.117)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.334*** (0.078) 0.416*** (0.115) 0.324*** (0.075) 0.440*** (0.122)
Hhold income 80+ 0.368*** (0.082) 0.489*** (0.124) 0.362*** (0.079) 0.523*** (0.132)
one child 0.079 (0.056) 0.151 (0.092) 0.084 (0.055) 0.179 (0.099)
two children 0.034 (0.077) 0.077 (0.131) 0.053 (0.075) 0.124 (0.140)
three children + 0.079 (0.144) 0.209 (0.240) 0.066 (0.138) 0.208 (0.253)
married -0.035 (0.150) -0.010 (0.254) -0.014 (0.144) 0.029 (0.261)
owns house 0.077 (0.062) 0.059 (0.108) 0.040 (0.061) 0.003 (0.115)
unemployed 0.006 (0.054) 0.002 (0.078) 0.012 (0.053) 0.009 (0.081)
age/10 0.247 (0.173) 0.545 (0.353) 0.219 (0.155) 0.450 (0.332)
(age/10)2 -0.038** (0.013) -0.079** (0.028) -0.033* (0.013) -0.064* (0.028)
cohort 25-35 0.029 (0.172) -0.022 (0.314) -0.008 (0.141) -0.08 (0.266)
cohort 35-45 0.092 (0.237) 0.114 (0.436) 0.039 (0.194) 0.006 (0.368)
cohort 45-55 0.525 (0.327) 0.840 (0.595) 0.388 (0.266) 0.583 (0.499)
cohort 55-65 0.526 (0.411) 0.891 (0.746) 0.392 (0.333) 0.625 (0.617)
cohort 65+ 0.732 (0.512) 1.391 (0.929) 0.575 (0.416) 1.033 (0.767)
retiree -0.057 (0.063) -0.071 (0.107) -0.067 (0.060) -0.11 (0.111)
10 years schooling 0.180** (0.068) 0.357** (0.135) 0.170** (0.058) 0.336** (0.119)
13 years schooling 0.296** (0.094) 0.630** (0.192) 0.279*** (0.083) 0.588*** (0.176)
college 0.227** (0.074) 0.419** (0.145) 0.162** (0.061) 0.298* (0.119)
university 0.153 (0.104) 0.249 (0.198) 0.108 (0.089) 0.159 (0.174)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.127 (0.224) 0.302 (0.428) 0.090 (0.181) 0.228 (0.337)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.635** (0.199) 1.229** (0.380) 0.473** (0.163) 0.903** (0.309)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.686** (0.210) 1.515*** (0.413) 0.521** (0.172) 1.181*** (0.334)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 1.212*** (0.192) 2.332*** (0.396) 0.890*** (0.163) 1.685*** (0.325)
one child -0.219 (0.181) -0.443 (0.331) -0.209 (0.148) -0.442 (0.275)
two children -0.096 (0.192) -0.215 (0.334) -0.117 (0.159) -0.281 (0.287)
three children+ -1.340*** (0.311) -2.505*** (0.622) -1.074*** (0.264) -2.058*** (0.527)
married -0.422* (0.199) -0.863* (0.361) -0.349* (0.177) -0.722* (0.331)
owns house -0.008 (0.096) 0.084 (0.177) 0.017 (0.084) 0.115 (0.159)
unemployed -0.205 (0.210) -0.380 (0.396) -0.186 (0.169) -0.348 (0.312)
ln(σˆ) -0.421*** (0.082) 0.635*** (0.087) -1.070*** (0.136) 0.504*** (0.101)
implied σˆ2 0.430 3.560 0.118 2.740
arctan(ρˆ) 1.703*** (0.043) 1.314*** (0.055)
implied ρˆ 0.936 0.865
N 17179 17179 17179 17179
χ2 2560.3 846.9 2904.0 708.5
AIC 11908.9 11725.7 11876.8 11667.6
BIC 12304.2 12128.8 12287.6 12086.2
Note: The dependent variable is one if a household owns one or more securities and zero otherwise. The constant and time
dummies are suppressed.
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Table 1.8: Average marginal effects
(2) (3) (4) (5)
ape se ape se ape se ape se
St−1 0.286 (0.010) 0.081 (0.017) 0.048 (0.015) 0.052 (0.017)
exp 0.056 (0.008) 0.040 (0.005)
rexp 0.042 (0.100) 0.030 (0.071)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.033 (0.014) 0.033 (0.015) 0.031 (0.014) 0.032 (0.015)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.043 (0.015) 0.044 (0.017) 0.042 (0.016) 0.043 (0.017)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.064 (0.016) 0.061 (0.019) 0.058 (0.017) 0.059 (0.018)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.071 (0.017) 0.073 (0.021) 0.069 (0.019) 0.072 (0.020)
10 years schooling 0.034 (0.013) 0.050 (0.021) 0.044 (0.016) 0.045 (0.017)
13 years schooling 0.058 (0.020) 0.095 (0.034) 0.079 (0.026) 0.083 (0.029)
college 0.044 (0.015) 0.059 (0.023) 0.038 (0.016) 0.039 (0.017)
university 0.029 (0.020) 0.033 (0.029) 0.020 (0.023) 0.020 (0.023)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
ape se ape se ape se ape se
St−1 0.288 (0.012) 0.056 (0.018) 0.278 (0.012) 0.126 (0.018)
exp 0.038 (0.004) 0.055 (0.007) 0.029 (0.003) 0.034 (0.004)
rexp -0.030 (0.055) 0.018 (0.078) -0.030 (0.049) -0.011 (0.063)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.030 (0.013) 0.031 (0.014) 0.025 (0.013) 0.026 (0.014)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.040 (0.014) 0.042 (0.016) 0.034 (0.014) 0.036 (0.015)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.060 (0.015) 0.059 (0.018) 0.050 (0.015) 0.051 (0.016)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.068 (0.016) 0.071 (0.020) 0.056 (0.016) 0.062 (0.018)
10 years schooling 0.030 (0.011) 0.041 (0.016) 0.016 (0.009) 0.020 (0.012)
13 years schooling 0.052 (0.016) 0.077 (0.026) 0.032 (0.013) 0.040 (0.018)
college 0.023 (0.011) 0.033 (0.015) 0.019 (0.009) 0.026 (0.012)
university 0.015 (0.015) 0.017 (0.021) -0.002 (0.013) -0.002 (0.016)
Note: Average marginal effects are reported for dummy and continuous variables. Standard errors (calculated with
the delta-method) are reported in parenthesis.
Tearing Down the Wall 44
Table 1.9: Robustness checks
(6) (7) (8) (9)
RE AR(1)-RE RE AR(1)-RE
β se β se β se β se
St−1 1.080*** (0.039) 0.355*** (0.103) 1.080*** (0.041) 0.668*** (0.086)
exp 0.229*** (0.021) 0.352*** (0.044) 0.199*** (0.019) 0.245*** (0.026)
exp2 -0.011*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.002)
rexp -0.316 (0.217) -0.016 (0.363) -0.354 (0.216) -0.231 (0.303)
rexp2 3.296*** (0.960) 1.870 (1.491) 3.657*** (0.978) 2.905* (1.320)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.161* (0.067) 0.232* (0.102) 0.142* (0.070) 0.178* (0.089)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.212** (0.071) 0.310** (0.112) 0.193** (0.074) 0.242* (0.095)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.310*** (0.074) 0.421*** (0.116) 0.275*** (0.078) 0.333*** (0.100)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.347*** (0.077) 0.500*** (0.125) 0.306*** (0.081) 0.401*** (0.107)
one child 0.086 (0.054) 0.168 (0.093) 0.078 (0.056) 0.103 (0.076)
two children 0.064 (0.073) 0.129 (0.130) 0.033 (0.076) 0.056 (0.107)
three children+ 0.079 (0.135) 0.199 (0.235) -0.004 (0.139) 0.047 (0.187)
married 0.011 (0.141) 0.038 (0.243) 0.089 (0.154) 0.102 (0.214)
owns house 0.025 (0.060) -0.003 (0.108) 0.083 (0.063) 0.077 (0.089)
unemployed 0.005 (0.052) 0.006 (0.077) 0.009 (0.057) 0.019 (0.070)
age/10 0.160 (0.144) 0.353 (0.295) -0.008 (0.140) 0.019 (0.221)
(age/10)2 -0.025* (0.012) -0.052* (0.025) -0.019 (0.012) -0.031 (0.019)
retiree -0.064 (0.058) -0.107 (0.104) -0.044 (0.059) -0.053 (0.084)
10 years schooling 0.155** (0.053) 0.298** (0.105) 0.090 (0.049) 0.127 (0.074)
13 years schooling 0.264*** (0.075) 0.524*** (0.156) 0.174* (0.070) 0.255* (0.108)
college 0.121* (0.053) 0.238* (0.103) 0.103* (0.047) 0.165* (0.072)
university 0.077 (0.079) 0.124 (0.151) -0.014 (0.072) -0.012 (0.109)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.062 (0.159) 0.177 (0.291) -0.079 (0.149) -0.104 (0.215)
Hhold income 40%− 60% 0.382** (0.144) 0.746** (0.271) -0.089 (0.136) -0.117 (0.197)
Hhold income 60%− 80% 0.411** (0.151) 0.964*** (0.291) 0.020 (0.142) 0.112 (0.206)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.714*** (0.147) 1.401*** (0.288) 0.058 (0.137) 0.095 (0.199)
dividendst−1 500-2000 0.011 (0.040) 0.024 (0.050)
dividendst−1 2000-5000 0.003 (0.067) 0.032 (0.084)
dividendst−1 2000-10000 0.117 (0.106) 0.137 (0.132)
dividendst−1 10000+ 0.356* (0.166) 0.426 (0.226)
dividendst−1 500− 2000 1.071*** (0.102) 1.585*** (0.180)
dividendst−1 2000− 5000 1.475*** (0.167) 2.192*** (0.281)
dividendst−1 5000− 10000 1.430*** (0.303) 2.072*** (0.469)
dividendst−1 10000+ 1.011* (0.476) 1.700* (0.784)
financial worries -0.067 (0.043) -0.076 (0.053)
financial worries -0.210* (0.107) -0.327* (0.161)
job worries 0.064 (0.048) 0.095 (0.060)
job worries 0.031 (0.134) 0.025 (0.199)
ln(σˆ) -1.611*** (0.208) 0.365** (0.111) -2.306*** (0.246) -0.100 (0.115)
implied σˆ2 0.040 0.481 0.010 0.819
arctan(ρˆ) 1.223*** (0.055) 1.185*** (0.048)
implied ρˆ 0.841 0.829
N 17179 17179 16025 16025
χ2 3250.0 775.0 4305.0 1463.5
AIC 11808.7 11658.0 10711.0 10635.8
BIC 12235.1 12092.0 11225.7 11158.1
Note: The dependent variable is one if a household owns one or more securities and zero otherwise. The constant, time
dummies, cohort dummies, and selected variables from x are suppressed.
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Table 1.10: Testing for attrition bias
(10) (11) (12) (13)
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted
β se β se β se β se
St−1 1.837*** (0.028) 1.854*** (0.029) 1.196*** (0.037) 1.184*** (0.039)
exp 0.286*** (0.014) 0.298*** (0.015)
exp2 -0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001)
rexp -0.304 (0.194) -0.258 (0.206)
rexp2 3.749*** (0.876) 3.639*** (0.946)
Hhold income 20%-40% 0.142* (0.060) 0.104 (0.067) 0.140* (0.062) 0.094 (0.069)
Hhold income 40%-60% 0.176** (0.064) 0.156* (0.070) 0.184** (0.066) 0.157* (0.072)
Hhold income 60%-80% 0.257*** (0.066) 0.238** (0.072) 0.271*** (0.068) 0.243** (0.074)
Hhold income 80%+ 0.269*** (0.070) 0.259*** (0.077) 0.302*** (0.071) 0.278*** (0.079)
one child 0.060 (0.050) 0.051 (0.053) 0.085 (0.051) 0.077 (0.054)
two children 0.021 (0.067) 0.015 (0.070) 0.075 (0.068) 0.069 (0.070)
three children+ 0.078 (0.120) 0.075 (0.124) 0.061 (0.121) 0.069 (0.124)
married -0.025 (0.128) -0.008 (0.143) 0.036 (0.129) 0.041 (0.142)
owns house 0.043 (0.057) 0.030 (0.060) -0.014 (0.058) -0.030 (0.061)
unemplreg 0.028 (0.048) 0.013 (0.049) 0.017 (0.048) -0.001 (0.050)
age/10 0.055 (0.119) 0.087 (0.123) 0.081 (0.121) 0.120 (0.126)
(age/10)2 -0.012 (0.011) -0.016 (0.011) -0.013 (0.011) -0.019 (0.011)
cohort 25-35 -0.004 (0.083) 0.014 (0.085) -0.072 (0.085) -0.065 (0.087)
cohort 35-45 0.026 (0.114) 0.046 (0.118) -0.057 (0.117) -0.046 (0.120)
cohort 45-55 0.256 (0.150) 0.283 (0.153) 0.139 (0.155) 0.167 (0.158)
cohort 55-65 0.215 (0.183) 0.287 (0.187) 0.114 (0.190) 0.184 (0.194)
cohort 65+ 0.309 (0.229) 0.392 (0.234) 0.179 (0.238) 0.275 (0.243)
retiree -0.039 (0.050) -0.023 (0.052) -0.062 (0.052) -0.047 (0.054)
10 years schooling 0.127*** (0.037) 0.147*** (0.040) 0.116** (0.038) 0.133** (0.041)
13 years schooling 0.211*** (0.053) 0.232*** (0.054) 0.198*** (0.055) 0.216*** (0.056)
college 0.110** (0.035) 0.116** (0.037) 0.063 (0.035) 0.047 (0.038)
university 0.097 (0.053) 0.067 (0.054) 0.030 (0.055) -0.002 (0.056)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.086 (0.109) 0.227* (0.115) 0.038 (0.112) 0.125 (0.119)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.311** (0.101) 0.385*** (0.108) 0.232* (0.104) 0.307** (0.111)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.352*** (0.106) 0.421*** (0.113) 0.257* (0.108) 0.318** (0.115)
Hhold income 20%− 40% 0.646*** (0.101) 0.745*** (0.110) 0.427*** (0.104) 0.511*** (0.113)
one child -0.177* (0.089) -0.175 (0.093) -0.185* (0.092) -0.183 (0.095)
two children -0.091 (0.099) -0.087 (0.103) -0.151 (0.102) -0.164 (0.106)
three children+ -0.870*** (0.174) -0.879*** (0.180) -0.622*** (0.178) -0.641*** (0.183)
married -0.205 (0.139) -0.272 (0.154) -0.221 (0.141) -0.258 (0.154)
owns house -0.013 (0.066) 0.044 (0.070) 0.053 (0.066) 0.106 (0.070)
unemployed -0.135 (0.099) -0.142 (0.104) -0.157 (0.101) -0.157 (0.106)
N 17179 17179 17179 17179
χ2 6074.0 5673.9 6166.9 5913.8
AIC 12616.5 12042.7 11864.7 11274.6
BIC 13004.0 12430.3 12283.3 11693.2
Note: Estimates are from pooled probit regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Specifications (11)
and (13) are weighted with inverse probability weights from probit regressions of the sampling probability. The constant
and time dummies are suppressed.
Chapter 2
Tax Incentives, Bequest Motives,
and the Demand for Life Insurance:
Evidence from Two Natural
Experiments in Germany1
2.1 Introduction
Life insurance is one of the most popular financial assets owned by a large number of
households in many countries (Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, 2002). In its simplest form
– term life insurance – it enables the policyholder to pass on bequests to children or
other beneficiaries if he or she dies before a certain point in time (the end of the term).
However, in many countries, life insurance products are a popular savings vehicle for
old age as well. Under whole life insurance contracts, the insurer faces a certain liabil-
ity over the whole lifetime of the insured, for which the insurer accumulates reserves
during the working life of the policyholder. Typically, the policyholder has the right to
withdraw the savings component in old age, provided he or she survives. As a result,
under whole life insurance term life insurance provisions are coupled with a savings
contract. This savings component of whole life insurance often receives tax prefer-
ences. Studying the demand for whole life insurance ownership has significant appeal
as it allows testing for both the importance of tax incentives and bequest motives in
households’ savings decisions. This paper explores these two aspects through a study
of whole life insurance ownership in Germany.
1This chapter is joint work together with Jan Walliser and Joachim Winter.
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Interest in providing incentives for retirement savings (including through whole
life insurance) intensified during the past few years. Many governments have already
reduced the generosity of existing pay-as-you-go pension systems, or are considering
doing so as their population ages. Hence, households are increasingly pressed to in-
crease their private savings portfolio in order to sustain the standards of living during
retirement, and governments seek to encourage these savings through preferential tax
rules. The empirical evidence on the importance of such tax incentives is, however,
inconclusive. Scholz (1994) documents little evidence that households modified their
portfolios in response to the 1986 US Tax Reform Act. Also, Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2003, 2007) do not find significant changes in the demand for life insurance and mort-
gage debt by those households most affected by incremental tax reforms in Italy. On
the other hand, several studies that use cross-sectional data report a positive correla-
tion between marginal tax rates and investments channeled into tax-sheltered assets for
Canada (Alan et al, 2008), Denmark (Alan and Leth-Petersen, 2006), the Netherlands
(Alessie, Hochguertel, van Soest, 1997), Sweden (Agell and Edlin, 1991), the United
Kingdom (Banks and Tanner, 2001), and the US (King and Leape, 1998; Poterba,
2002; Poterba and Samwick, 2003). Yet in cross-sections, it is difficult to disentangle
genuine variation in marginal tax rates for given income, from genuine variation in
income for given tax rates, because after-tax-yields depend on changing marginal tax
rates, which in turn depend on income levels.2
Our analysis contributes to the literature on taxation and portfolio choice by ex-
ploiting a natural experiment of changes to tax incentives for whole life insurance in
Germany. A tax reform in 2000 enables us to identify different investor responses
among those affected by the reform, and a control group that remains unaffected with-
out further need for statistical inferences. The changes in tax laws reduced the limit
on tax exemptions and created a strong incentive among households that were fully
exempt from capital income taxation before the reform to shelter their savings from
taxation by investing in (tax-exempt) life insurance contracts afterwards. In contrast
to the prior literature, this allows us to review the impact of changing tax incentives
at the margin rather than incremental changes in after-tax returns. The results sug-
gest that standard tax revenue estimates, which ignore behavioral changes of portfolio
choices, may overestimate potential revenue effects from introducing capital income
taxation (Poterba and Verdugo, 2008).
A second aspect studied in this paper relates to the importance of bequest motives
as driver for savings behavior. Empirical studies disagree about the strength of bequest
2In his seminal contribution, Feldstein (1976) even uses labor income as a proxy for the marginal
tax rate.
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motives. Estimates of the share of bequests in aggregate private savings range from
17 (Modigliani, 1988) to 46 percent (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981). Cross-country
evidence shows that life insurance demand is higher in countries with a high depen-
dency ratio (Browne and Kim, 1993), high income per capita, low inflation, and a high
degree of banking sector development (Beck and Webb, 2003). At the household level,
Bernheim (1991) finds that a significant fraction of life insurance demand and consump-
tion can be motivated by the desire to leave bequests to one’s children. Kopczuk and
Lupton (2007) estimate that households with a bequest motive save about 25 percent
more, whereas Hurd (1987, 1989) finds that the marginal utility from bequests in a
consumption-savings model is close to zero. Data on direct questions for the intention
to leave bequest has been used by Laitner and Juster (1995) and Ju¨rges (2001). Al-
though both find that bequest motives shape savings behavior, altruism toward one’s
children appears to be of only minor importance. All these studies suffer from the
difficulty to distinguish true bequest motives from other savings motives, such as tax,
life-cycle, or precautionary motives. In this paper, we are able to identify the impor-
tance of bequest motives in the demand for life insurance by exploiting the natural
experiment of the division of Germany into two separate states. Owing to the absence
of tax incentives and the limited number of consumption and savings possibilities in
the former German Democratic Republic, we can isolate the impact of bequest motives
on the demand for life insurance, while controlling for the main life-cycle and precau-
tionary savings motives.
Our key empirical findings confirm the predictions from our theoretical model.
First, the probability to own tax-exempt whole life insurance contracts increases by 6
percent among households affected by the tax reform in 2000 (i.e., among those house-
holds loosing their exemption from capital income taxation). Second, there is also
strong indication that households in the former GDR – where life insurance demand
was not diluted by tax considerations – purchased life insurance to bequeath wealth to
their children, whereas provision for non-working partners seems to play a lesser role.
This paper proceeds by discussing some key theoretical predictions from a formal
model of life insurance demand in section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section
2.4 analyzes the impact of the German tax reform in 2000 on life insurance demand. In
section 2.5, estimates of the strength of bequest motives in GDR life insurance demand
are reported. Finally, section 2.6 wraps up the discussion.
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2.2 A Life-Cycle Model with Tax incentives and
Bequests
A number of papers in the economics literature model the demand for term life in-
surance. Term insurance pays a benefit if the insured dies before a certain date. The
first model for term life insurance in a continuous time setting is Yaari (1965). Fischer
(1973) develops a life cycle model of term life insurance demand in discrete time and
discusses the allocation of insurance purchases over the life cycle. Less common is the
modeling of whole life insurance. Whole life insurance requires the build-up of insur-
ance reserves because the insured typically pays premiums only during working life.
The premiums must therefore also finance the accumulation of reserves sufficiently to
meet expected later obligations. Many whole life insurance contracts enable the insured
to take out those reserves (the cash value or surrender value) after a certain age, and
therefore resemble a combination of term life insurance with a savings plan. Babbel
and Ohtsuka (1989) build a three-period model with uncertainty about future rates of
return and health status that allows for simultaneous purchase of term life insurance
and whole life insurance, overcoming the problem that whole life insurance is usually
dominated by a combination of term life insurance and a savings plan. However, their
model is inherently difficult to solve even with sophisticated numerical methods. More-
over, Babbel and Ohtsuka do neither capture the tax preferences of life insurance nor
consider the effect of public pension programs on life insurance demand.
Following the standard approach, this paper derives life insurance demand in a
model with a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive (one exception is Lewis, 1989). The
model has three periods and three types of assets, life insurance, bonds, and public
pensions. Life insurance is modeled as a combination of term life insurance and a sav-
ings plan. Our specification incorporates the salient features of the German tax and
pension system.
In the three-period model, the timing convention used is as follows: consumption
streams in the three periods are indexed by 0, 1, and 2, and end-of-period bequests
are indexed by 1, 2, 3, respectively. A consumer can use his income to purchase life
insurance L or save an amount S of bonds. Bonds earn a rate of return r and the
return is subject to a capital income tax of τC . Moreover, individuals must contribute
to a public pension system with a payroll tax τS and they receive pensions in old age.
The pension system has an internal rate of return of g.
More formally, consider the following expected utility function in consumption, c,
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and bequests, b:
W (c, b) =
2∑
t=0
1
1− γ
(
1
1 + δ
)t
[c1−γt + ηt+1b
1−γ
t+1 (1− pit+1)]
t∏
s=1
pis, (2.1)
where δ represents the pure rate of time preference, γ is the risk aversion parameter
of the constant relative risk aversion utility function, η is the weight on bequests and
pit is the probability to survive at the beginning of period t. Since death at the end of
period 2 is certain, pi3 = 0.
To simplify notation, let 1 + r = R, 1 + r(1 − τC) = RC , and 1 + g = G. The
utility maximization is then subject to the following budget constraints in the first two
periods (t = 0, 1):
ct = wt(1− τS)− ZtLt+1 − St+1 + StRC + αLt (2.2)
bt+1 = St+1R + Lt+1. (2.3)
Here, w stands for labor earnings. α is the exogenous savings portion of the life
insurance contract – if the policy holder survives, a fraction of the insurance sum (the
cash value) can be withdrawn. Note also that in case of death the estate receives the
full rate of return on bonds, implicitly assuming that there are no estate taxes to be
paid.
Consumers retire in their third period of life and receive a public pension. Since life
ends with certainty after period 2, there is no role for life insurance in the last period.
Consequently, the budget constraints are as follows:
c2 = τ
S(w0G
2 + w1G)− S3 + S2RC + αL2 (2.4)
b3 = S3R. (2.5)
The first order conditions imply the following relationship between consumption in
different periods and consumption and bequest for t = 1, 2:
ct
ct−1
=
[
1− Zt−1R
pit
1+δ
(RC − αR)
]− 1
γ
(2.6)
and
ct
bt
=
[
(1− pit)ηt(1− Zt−1R)
pit
1+δ
(RCZt−1 − α)
]− 1
γ
(2.7)
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Bequests at the end of period 2 are simply:
b3 = c2(Rη3)
1
γ (2.8)
Using equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), the consumer’s maximization problem can be
solved recursively. The algebraic solution is fairly complicated and therefore provides
few immediate insights (see the Appendix). However, the first-order conditions offer
some qualitative predictions for variations in key variables. In general, people buy life
insurance for three reasons in our model: first, life insurance enhances bequeathable
wealth and is therefore valuable especially at younger ages when savings are still small.
Second, life insurance has a tax advantage over other savings. Third, if the consumer
considers public pension coverage as too generous he can deannuitize by purchasing
life insurance.3
Consider first the impact of tax changes on portfolio choices. Suppose two house-
holds have the same household income but differ in their tax rate on capital income τC .
According to equations (2.6) and (2.7), the two households would differ in their con-
sumption, bequest, and portfolio choices. As indicated by equation (2.6), a household
facing a lower tax rate (higher RC) would choose a steeper consumption profile be-
cause higher after-tax rates of returns make future consumption “cheaper.” As shown
in equation (2.7), that household would also choose to bequeath less than the household
facing higher tax since lower taxes make future consumption cheaper but do not affect
the implicit price for bequests. Equations (2.6) and (2.7) and the budget constraints
also imply a different portfolio choice. For reasonable parameter choices, the household
with lower tax rates can satisfy (2.6) and (2.7) simultaneously only if it holds less life
insurance and more savings than the household with higher tax rates. Lowering life in-
surance by a dollar and increasing savings by a dollar in period 0 reduces consumption
by Z0− 1 dollars. Under the assumption that insurance is fair, Z0 = 1−pi1R + αpi1R , which
is less than 1, the reallocation thus reduces resources in the first period. It increases
resources in the following period by RC − α which exceeds 1 for reasonable parameter
choices.4 Moreover, such a reallocation increases bequests by R − 1, which is smaller
than RC −α as long as (R− 1)τ c+α is less than 1, which again is the case for reason-
able parameter choices. In summary, reallocating a dollar from life insurance to savings
lowers current resources, increases future resources, and increases future resources for
3Yaari (1965) discusses why in perfect markets purchasing life insurance is equivalent to purchasing
a negative annuity.
4For example, assuming interest rates of three percent per year, an α of around 0.2 implies in a
three period model that roughly 80 percent of life insurance premiums contribute to the accumulation
of reserves in the first period of life.
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consumption more than for bequests.
An analogous argument holds for changes in the parameter α that determines the
savings content of whole life insurance. Lowering α has the same effect on first-order
conditions as lowering the tax rate on capital income. Thus, quite intuitively, equa-
tions (2.6) and (2.7) together with the budget constraints also predict that lowering
the implicit savings portion of life insurance leads households to shift more resources
away from life insurance and towards regular savings.
As equation (2.7) demonstrates, increasing the strength of bequest motives leads
to the result that the relative size of bequest to consumption must increase, while the
relative size of consumption in different periods remains constant according to equa-
tion (2.6). Clearly, the less costly way to increase bequests is to purchase more life
insurance. However, unlike the previous results, it depends on specific parameter val-
ues whether both saving and life insurance increase or whether life insurance demand
increases and savings falls.
Finally, varying the size of the public pension system also matters for both saving
and life insurance. As is well-known, public pensions crowd out private savings in a
life-cycle model. To the extent that life insurance is a savings instrument, one would
therefore expect life insurance demand to fall. However, for people who feel that the
public pension is too generous, purchasing more life insurance is a way to increase
bequests and reduce the “overannuitization”. Thus, the precise effect of public pension
coverage on life insurance demand depends on the relative magnitude of the savings
and bequest motives.
To summarize, the stylized life-cycle model presented in this section delivers two
main testable predictions regarding life-insurance demand. First, controlling for in-
come, people facing lower relative tax rates on other savings should purchase less
whole life insurance to accommodate a steeper consumption profile. Second, people
with stronger bequest motives, for example married people or households with chil-
dren, should have stronger incentives to purchase life insurance. The impact of public
pension coverage on life insurance demand is ambiguous.
2.3 The Data
The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) offers a unique opportunity to study the
effect of tax reform and bequest motives on the demand for life insurance. It is the
only dataset containing annual information about life insurance ownership and portfolio
choice of German households that spans from pre- to post-reform years. And, it allows
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studying portfolios in the territory of the GDR, where a survey containing around
2000 households started in 1990 prior to reunification. The first survey in the West
was conducted in 1984. Since then, the sample has been significantly increased in 1998
and 2000. Descriptive evidence for the development of the sample is provided in table
2.1.5
Households are asked annually if they owned one or more life insurance policies
in the previous year. Thus, we only use observations for households that take part
in two successive surveys. If not otherwise stated, socioeconomic characteristics are
proxied by the household head. We approximate marginal tax rates by re-calculating
each household’s taxable income from these (estimated) tax payments, using the official
formulas of the federal tax office.6 A 1 unit change in taxable income is simulated in
order to approximate the marginal tax rate.
2.4 Tax Incentives
Life insurance is the second most common asset after savings accounts in Germany. In
2007, 15.6 percent of total private wealth, amounting to 716 billion Euro, was allocated
to life insurance (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008). Overall, 93.9 million life insurance
policies existed, of which 7,617,400 had been sold in that year (Gesamtverband der
Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, 2008). On the flipside of the market, around 49
percent of households own life insurance policies.7
One of the main reasons for this unusually high popularity in Germany is the
favored fiscal treatment of life insurance policies (and whole life insurance in particular).
Firstly, returns on life insurances are tax exempt if the contract lasts for at least
12 years, premiums are paid during at least five years, and the term life insurance
component amounts to at least 60 percent of the total benefit paid out at the end of the
contract. Secondly, annual contributions to whole life and term life insurance contracts
are tax deductible. However, this is typically of little benefit for employees, as they
reach the deductibility cap with their obligatory contributions to the social security
5The Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for ex-
tracting the data. See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO
file to retrieve the data used here is available upon request. Any data or computational errors are our
own.
6The GSOEP estimates of total tax payments are based on Schwarze’s (1995) approach. Schwarze
adds up the incomes of all household members and applies standard deductions based on the socioe-
conomic status of the household.
7Authors’ calculation based on data from the GSOEP. Typically, life insurance policies have one
beneficiary, so that it makes sense for households with several children to invest into several policies.
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system. Obligatory contributions are smaller for civil servants and the deductibility
cap is higher for the self-employed, who are generally exempt from contributing to the
public pension system and must provide for their own retirement income and survivor’s
benefits (Sommer, 2007). Finally, in the case of bequests, only two-thirds of the cash
value of life insurance policies are taxed. It is even possible to avoid estate taxes
altogether if, for instance, a husband pays premiums into a life insurance policy owned
by his wife, who also is the beneficiary if he dies early.
The 2000 tax reform had a major impact on the treatment of whole life insurance,
and it had a visible effect on whole life insurance sales trends. Figure 2.1 plots the
development of sales of new life insurance contracts between 1995 and 2003 in Germany.
During the entire period, sales of term life insurance policies are relatively constant
around 700,000. However, sales of new whole life contracts spike in 1999, indicating an
anticipation effect of the tax reform. As taxpayer groups have been affected differently
by the reforms, in this paper we can clearly identify the response of households’ savings
allocation to changes in after-tax yields.
2.4.1 The Tax Reform in 2000
Germany taxes all interest and dividend income exceeding a certain threshold at the
households’ marginal tax rate. The development of this threshold, the so-called Spar-
erfreibetrag (tax exemption limit), is shown in table 2.1 for the period from 1996 and
2001. In March 1999, a law was passed, cutting the tax exemption limit from DM6,000
(12,000) to DM3,000 (6,0000) for singles (couples) from January 1, 2000 onward. We
suspect that households between the old and the new tax exemption limit were dispro-
portionately affected by this reform. As their capital returns were fully exempt from
taxation beforehand, the reform created a strong incentive to shelter their savings from
taxation by purchasing whole life insurance when the reform was announced. In other
words, if these households are responsive to the relative tax treatment, we should see
a disproportionate increase of life insurance purchases among the group threatened to
have their regular savings income taxed by the reduction of tax exemptions. In what
follows, we denote households belonging to this category as the “treatment group”.
In order to identify the treatment group, we use survey responses on capital in-
come levels. One quarter of all households report their exact income from interest and
dividends in the survey, whereas three quarters indicate on an ordinal scale if their
capital income is less than 500, between 500-2,000, 2,000-5,000, 5,000-10,000, or above
10,000 DM. These ordinal thresholds reduce precision of estimating the response to tax
changes, biasing the results against finding significant differences between groups. We
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use a difference-in-differences estimator to test if the treatment group is more likely to
own one or more (tax-exempt) life insurance policies from 2000 onward.
Our empirical analysis is subject to two additional considerations. First, in June
1999, the government proposed to abolish the tax exemption on life insurance returns
by end 1999. Many households were concerned about losing a tax-favored savings
opportunity, boosting sales of new contracts by 38.7 percent in 1999. Dolle-Helms
(1999a, 199b) provides anecdotal evidence that last minute purchases in 1999 were
mainly driven by tax motives. The reform eventually failed in the upper house of
parliament (Bundesrat) in mid-December and many investors (unsuccessfully) claimed
their money back. All households, including those above the new exemption limit were
also potentially affected by the proposed and later dropped reform in 1999. To identify
the impact of the 2000 reform that affected the relative tax treatment of life insurance
and other savings for people below the DM6,000 limit we test if, from 1999 onward,
the ownership probability among the treatment group increases relative to wealthier
households whose capital income was already above the DM6,000 exemption limit.
The implicit underlying identifying assumption is that both the treatment and control
group responded equally (in proportional terms) to the announced phasing out of tax
advantages for life insurance. Second, the 2000 reform may also have had an impact on
those households already paying taxes on capital income since their total tax exempt
amounts would fall. However, these households would not be at the margin of having
to start paying capital income taxes. If tax incentives matter, households with high
capital incomes should already have invested into life insurance before the reform in
order to shelter their savings from taxation, and the response would be intra-marginal.
Descriptive evidence in table 2.2 confirms that indeed significant changes only
occurred in the treatment group. Life insurance ownership rates remained constant
among households below the new tax exemption limit and above the old exemption
limit. However, the ownership rate increased strongly from 62.5 to 69.7 percent in the
treatment group in 1999. This shows that households affected by the tax reform in
2000 advanced their investments and stocked up on (tax-exempt) life insurance policies
before the reform came into effect.
2.4.2 Empirical Results
We estimate a reduced-form model in order to analyze the effect of tax reform on
life insurance demand. In particular, a before and after comparison is made be-
tween a control group of investors that are unaffected by the reform with a treat-
ment group that is affected by the new tax regime, using a difference-in-differences
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estimator on repeated cross-sectional data. We denote individual i’s binary indica-
tor for the treatment group as Gi. For the reform in 2000, the treated are defined
as Git = 1{limitnew ≤ INCCAPit ≤ limitold}, where INCCAPit denotes total capital
income. Ti = 1{t ≥ 1999} is a time dummy indicating the anticipated reform. To
ease the notational burden, we introduce the shorthand Yi∈g,t for Yi|Gi = g, Ti = t.
The potential outcomes with and without treatment are Y 1i and Y
0
i respectively. The
model for the outcome without intervention is given by
Y 0i = αTi + βGi + ²i,
where ²i ⊥ (Ti, Gi). The model for the treatment group is
Y 1i = α + β + τ
DiD + ²i,
In the absence of intervention, the average outcome for the treatment group is
E[Y 0i∈1,1] = E[Yi∈1,0]+E[Yi∈0,1]−E[Yi∈0,0]. The average treatment effect on the treated
is defined as
τDiD = E[Y 1i∈1,1]− E[Y 0i∈1,1] (2.9)
= E[Yi∈1,1]− E[Yi∈1,0]− (E[Yi∈0,1]− E[Yi∈0,0]).
This estimator requires three identifying assumptions. First, we assume that the tax
reform is exogenous to the ownership decision. Investors were hit by surprise, when the
tax reforms were announced in 1999, since the reforms were not mentioned in election
campaigns or the coalition program of the incoming government. We can also safely
exclude the possibility of policy endogeneity, because the reform was not introduced
to change the demand for life insurance by different taxpayer groups. It was part of a
major tax reform package with the aim of broadening the tax base. Second, we assume
that there are no group specific trends in life insurance ownership. This assumption
guarantees that the counterfactual of the treated can be inferred from the time trend of
the control group. As discussed above, this assumption certainly holds for households
above the new exemption limit. Third, we assume that the tax reform is exogenous
with respect to sample composition. Essentially, this requires that household income
as well as interest and dividend income did not change as a result of the tax reform
itself. One caveat could be that interest and dividend income falls when a household
buys life insurance. However, households typically pay annual premiums of less than
DM2,000 (Sommer, 2007) which would only marginally affect total capital income at
reasonable interest rates. Also, the presence of such wealth effects would rather bias
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the results against our findings.
The upper panel of table 2.3 reports the average effects of the tax reform, using a
sample from three years before and three years after the announcement of the reform.
While ownership rates of life insurance fell among households in the control group from
1999 onwards, an increase by 4.5 percent can be observed for the treatment group. The
difference-in-differences estimate according to equation 2.9 is 5.7 percent for the full
sample and 5.9 percent for households above the new exemption limit.8
These estimates may be biased for two reasons. First, the estimated probabilities
of investing into life insurance do not necessarily lie in the [0, 1] interval. Second,
the effects could be blurred because other determinants account for different behavior
across groups. Thus, we translate the difference-in-differences approach into a probit
regression that imposes bounds on the estimated probabilities and accounts for other
covariates.
The model for the outcome without intervention is given by
P (Y 0i = 1|Gi, Ti,xi) = Φ(αTi + βGi + xiδ).
The model for the treatment group is
P (Y 1i∈1,1 = 1|xi) = Φ(α + β + γ + xiδ),
Puhani (2008) shows that in a nonlinear model, such as probit, the treatment effect
on the treated should not be confused with the cross-derivative of the interaction term
(Ai and Norton, 2003). Based on the standard probit difference-in-differences model
P (Yi = 1|Gi, Ti,xi) = Φ(αTi + βGi + γTiGi + xiδ),
a consistent estimator of the treatment effect is
τˆDiD = E[Y 1i∈1,1|xi]− E[Y 0i∈1,1|xi] (2.10)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Φ(αˆ+ βˆ + γˆ + xiδˆ)− Φ(αˆ+ βˆ + xiδˆ)).
Hence, the treatment effect is zero if and only if the coefficient γ is zero. We apply
the delta-method to infer statistical significance of the average treatment effect in
small samples. Different from the linear model, identification is not provided by the
assumption that the cross difference γ is zero for the expected potential outcome Y 0i ,
8Estimates are similar, if all observations for the transition year 1999 are dropped.
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because group and time differences in the conditional expectation of the potential
outcome Y 0i are not constant in the nonlinear probit model. However, a nonlinear
parametric restriction on that cross-difference guarantees that all expected outcomes
(factual or counterfactual) are bounded as required (Athey and Imbens, 2006).
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics of the additional covariates included in the
regression. In particular, we include the marginal tax rate to control for differences in
after-tax returns. We proxy for the household’s net labor income via binary indicators
for deciles of the income distribution. Dummies for house ownership as well as interest
and dividend returns control for household wealth. Furthermore, martial status and
a binary indicator for households with one or more children, as in Hurd (1987, 1989),
capture bequest motives. Dummies for emplyoment status, civil servants and the self-
employed reflect specific characteristics of the German tax and public pension system.
Finally, the model includes gender, education, and linear and non-linear terms of the
age of the household head. We use data for three years before and after the reform.
The full sample consists of 44,540 observations and 2,419 if we constrain the analysis
to households above the new exemption limit.
Table 2.5 reports average marginal effects for continuous and dummy variables. The
interaction effect τˆDiD is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in both equations.
According to equation 2.10, the tax reform increased ownership among households
affected by the reform by 5.2 percent. The estimate is 8.9 percent for the restricted
sample in column (2). Furthermore, the estimates of the marginal effects in columns
(1) and (2) show a highly significant positive correlation between marginal tax rates
and investment into life insurance. The model in column (1) suggests that an increase
of the marginal tax rate by 10 percentage points increases the ownership probability
by 3.3 percentage points. Also, there is evidence that the self-employed, who have
larger tax incentives and lower pensions, are more likely to own life insurance policies.
We find no evidence that life insurance ownership is higher among civil servants, who
typically receive relatively generous survivor benefits.
However, the picture is less clear with regard to bequest motives. Although there is
strong evidence that married couples invest into life insurance, we cannot confirm that
households with children are more likely to own life insurance. These mixed results
are much in line with the previous literature that finds evidence in both directions.
One reason for these ambiguous results stems from the impossibility of past studies to
neatly single out bequest motives from other forms of savings motives. For instance,
we would be unable to identify bequest motives in the presence of strong tax incentives
if households with children were liquidity constrained in the short run.
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2.5 Bequest Motives
Our identification strategy for bequest motives in life insurance demand relies crucially
on the assumption that the specific institutional environment in the GDR allows us
to control for the main alternative savings motives discussed in the literature such as
tax, life-cycle, and precautionary savings motives (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). The
following section describes the peculiarities of the market for life insurance in the GDR.
Throughout the section, bequest motives are defined as a willful desire to hand on one’s
wealth to close relatives or friends during lifetime or posthumously.
2.5.1 Savings Environment in the GDR
Whole life insurance played an important role in household portfolios in the GDR.
Before reunification, East Germans could only chose between investing into savings
accounts or life insurance. Therefore, life insurance was typically considered as a long-
term savings contract (with an additional term life insurance option). While savings
accounts offered a unitary interest rate of 3.25 percent (Schwarzer, 1999), calculatory
returns on life insurance were about 3.5 percent plus a 15 percent terminal bonus. The
only provider of insurance was the Staatliche Versicherung der DDR, of which Allianz
acquired the private client business after reunification.9
Tax incentives. A major advantage of studying life insurance demand in the GDR
is that returns on savings accounts and insurances were fully exempt from taxation.
Also, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy was exempt from death taxes (Schulze,
1970). Different from all existing studies on bequest motives, our analysis will therefore
not be diluted by tax considerations.
Life-cycle savings motives. Another key feature of savings decisions in the GDR
is that consumption possibilities were very limited, enabling us to control for ownership
of all goods and services for which GDR citizens needed to accumulated large deposits.
In particular, we can control for the five main life-cycle and down-payment motives:
First, we condition for life-cycle saving effects through linear and nonlinear terms of
age as well as an indicator for the retirement status of the household head. Around 40
percent of all retirees also participated in an additional retirement pension supplement
plan. However, average pensions were about 450 (550 with the supplement) Mark in
9We thank Dr. Michael Lehner from Allianz for providing detailed information about the life
insurance market in the GDR.
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1986, compared to an average labor income of 960 Mark (Dabbert, 1992).10 Hence, the
elderly had to rely on their savings for a sufficient retirement income. Second, house-
holds had little incentive to use life insurance to accumulate deposits for buying an
own apartment or house. The communist government restricted ownership of private
property and largely subsidized construction of rental housing. Also, it was very cheap
to live in a rented apartment, since rents were fixed by the central government and
too low to recover maintenance cost (Manzel, 1992). Third, only few durables required
large downpayments. There is anecdotal evidence that life insurance contracts were
used to buy cars. This was a sensible thing to do, because the average duration of life
insurance policies, 11.6 years, matched the average delivery time for a car, 13.5 years
(Wolle, 1999).11 The only other durables for which large deposits were necessary are
motorcycles and weekend houses (Datschas). The data allow us to control for these
three durables when estimating the strength of bequest motives. Fourth, we rule out
the possibility that citizens used life insurance as a means to save for travel. The dura-
tion of life insurance policies does typically not match the decision to travel. Moreover,
travel restrictions were not lifted before the 1970s and even then GDR citizens could
only travel to four foreign countries without a visa (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Bulgaria). Often, travelling was further complicated by scarce foreign exchange (Saret-
zki and Kohn, 1992). Other leisure activities did typically not require larger amounts
of money. Yet some social activities may affect mortality risk (sports) or provide an
information network that increases the awareness for life insurance products. The re-
gression includes indicators for households that go at least once a month to the cinema
or theater, a cultural event, the church, do active sports, visit friends, or help neigh-
bors. Fifth, private spending on education did not exist under the communist regime
in the GDR. The government fully funded primary and higher education as well as
vocational training (Marggraf, 1992). Access to higher education required membership
in the GDR youth organization (FDJ ), and favored entry for children from working
class backgrounds.
Precautionary savings motives. Economists disagree sharply as to why people
bequeath wealth. In contrast to the view that bequests are intentional, Hurd (1987)
suggests that bequest are only an accidental remnant of precautionary savings. Yet
the social system in the GDR gave very few reasons to accumulate wealth as a buffer
for uncertain times. We believe that our regression captures the remaining precaution-
10The Deutsche Mark (DM) should not be confused with the Mark which was the official currency
of the GDR. Mark (East) were exchanged 1:1 for Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1990. However, the cash
value of life insurance policies and savings above 4,000 Mark were exchanged 2:1.
11A fashionable nickname for life insurance used to be Trabi-Sparvertrag (savings contract for a
Trabant (“Trabi”) car).
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ary motives and therefore yields unbiased estimates of bequest motives. First, East
Germans did not have to hedge against income fluctuations, because full employment
was constitutionally guaranteed. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) also argue
that income differences and volatility were very low. Second, we can control for the
self-assessed health status of each individual, which could affect precautionary savings,
although health services were fully provided by the central government.12 Third, peo-
ple have been asked if they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the social benefits
available in the GDR. Dissatisfaction could denote a larger demand for precautionary
savings. Finally, the data provide a proxy for individual risk preferences. People indi-
cate on a 0-10 scale if they consider it to be desirable for one to be security-conscious
(0-10 scale).
Bequest motives. If bequests are intentional, they may either reflect altruism
(Tomes, 1981), self-interested exchange with one’s heirs (Bernheim, Shleifer, Summers,
1985), or the outcome of an intra-household reallocation of incomes (Gandolfi and
Miners, 1996). Gandolfi and Miners argue that families insure the labor income of the
main bread-earner through life insurance. We proxy for potential reallocation motives
by the wife’s labor force participation status and the income differential between hus-
band and wife. Like Hurd (1987, 1989) and Ju¨rges (2001), we use a dummy indicating
if a household has one or more children in order to proxy for altruistic and strategic
motives. The questionnaire also asks the household head if his family is very important
to his sense of well-being and personal satisfaction. However, it difficult to differenti-
ate altruistic from strategic motives, since the survey does not ask for the intention of
households’ bequests.
2.5.2 Empirical Results
Age profiles for life insurance ownership rates in the GDR are depicted in figure 2.2.
Note that age and cohort effects cannot be separately identified, as we only use a sin-
gle cross-section of data in this section. Ownership rates display a hump shape that
is broadly consistent with life-cycle insurance demand as derived from the model in
section 2.2. Life insurance ownership peaks between ages 20 to 40, while in older ages
households cash out their insurance policies.
Descriptive evidence for the presence of bequest motives in GDR life insurance de-
mand is presented in table 2.6. Insurance ownership is clearly higher among married
couples, households with children, households with higher labor incomes, civil servants,
12The questionnaire reads: “How satisfied are you with your health?” (0-10 scale).
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and house owners. Education and wealth seem to play a minor role. The descriptive
evidence is hard to reconcile with the notion of intra-household reallocation motives.
While ownership rates are higher for households with lager income differences, the con-
trary holds if the partner is not participating in the labor force.
We estimate probit models for the ownership probability in 1990. Table 2.7 re-
ports average marginal effects for continuous and dummy variables. We do not report
separate average partial effects for the hump shaped effects of age and income on
the ownership decision. All specifications provide robust evidence for the presence of
bequest motives among households with children. Column (4) reports that the proba-
bility to own one or more life insurance policies is independent of the number of children
within a household. On average, households with children are 7 percentage points more
likely to own life insurance. Column (5) also controls for the attitudes of investors.
Only investors for whom family is very important show a significantly higher partic-
ipation probability of around seven percentage points. No significant correlation can
be identified between insurance demand and attitudes such as security-consciousness,
importance of social security, or self-assessed health status. We also control for differ-
ent indicators of leisure activities in column (6), which reflect social interaction effects
(Hong, Kubik, Stein, 2004). However, these indicators are neither individually nor
jointly significant.
Because many households cash out their whole life insurance policies at retirement,
we test whether that fact has a significant impact on regression results. Column (7)
presents estimates for a subsample of households with a head of less than 65 years
of age. In this subsample, age effects are insignificant indicating that age profiles are
similar among the working population. The previous findings are broadly confirmed in
this smaller sample. Estimates of potential bequest motives are statistically significant
and of similar size, as in the full sample. There is no indication that investors insure
the labor income of the main earner.
2.6 Conclusion
Whole life insurance plays an important role in household saving. In a stylized model
both tax incentives and bequest motives drive whole life insurance demand. While a
bequest motive could be satisfied by term life insurance, sheltering savings from cap-
ital income taxation is only possible with whole life policies. The empirical evidence
presented is consistent with the theoretical predictions. In particular, we study two
natural experiments in Germany. A tax reform in 2000 halved the tax exemption limit
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for capital income. We find that the demand for life insurance increases particularly
among that group of households, which did not pay taxes on capital returns prior to
the reform.
Our results contrast to Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, 2007) who do not find that tax
incentives matter for life insurance demand in Italy. However, anecdotal evidence tells
that sales agents exploited the favorable market situation in Germany, whereas Italian
insurers lacked the vital initiative to point out the effects of the tax reform among
potential investors. Moreover, the tax incentive resulting from incremental changes
in after-tax yields in Italy might be too small to induce significant changes in invest-
ment behavior if inertia are present. The specific features of the German reform which
establish a natural experiment and the richness of our data provide a truly unique
opportunity to show that increases in capital income taxation induce a shift of the
portfolio towards tax-exempt assets. The results suggest that standard tax revenue
estimates, which assume that current investors would stick to their asset choices if
capital taxation were introduced, may be misleading. Governments need to account
for changes in investment behavior due to tax reforms (Poterba and Verdugo, 2008).
With regard to bequest motives, we analyze the demand for life insurance in the
experimental setting of the GDR, where our estimates are not diluted by tax consid-
erations or life-cycle and precautionary savings motives. We find a significantly higher
ownership probability among households with children and a high regard for the fam-
ily. Life insurance demand does not seem to depend on intra-household allocation
motives. As a note of caution, we admit that our results are based on are very peculiar
institutional setting. Yet in contrast to our expectations and in favor of a broader
applicability of our findings, GDR life insurance demand demonstrates the importance
of bequest motives despite the omnipresence of a paternalist communist state.
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Technical Appendix
The solution for first period consumption c0 can be derived as follows:
c0 =(1 + 1
R
(Rη3)
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]
The solution for c0 in combination with equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) immediately
implies values for c1, c2, b1, b2, b3 and thus, by applying the budget constraints, also for
L1 and L2.
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Figure 2.1: The graph depicts sales of new life insurance contracts in Germany, 1996-2001. Source:
Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (2008).
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Table 2.1: Tax exemption limits on capital income
Period Exemption limit Treatment group Treatment group
on capital income [exact] [categorical]
limitnew-limitold l˜imit
new
-l˜imit
old
1996-1999
single 6000 DM 3,000-6,000 DM 2,000-5,000 DM
(couple) (12,000) (6,000-12,000) (5,000-10,000)
2000-2001
single 3000 DM 3,000-6,000 DM 2,000-5,000 DM
(couple) (12,000) (6,000-12,000) (5,000-10,000)
Note: The table reports the development of tax exemption limits on capital
income in Germany for singles (married couples). The thresholds for the old
and new exemption limits, limitold and limitnew, define the upper and lower
bounds of the treatment group and are either assigned by exact or categorical
(indicated by tilde) interest and dividend returns.
Table 2.2: Tax incentives - average ownership rates 1996-2001
as a % of all observations in the subpopulation
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Full sample 54.72 55.79 54.56 55.29 54.67 52.38
N 6,594 6,383 7,159 6,980 11,662 11,193
INCCAP < limitnew 54.28 55.52 54.20 54.48 54.09 51.85
N 6,278 6,092 6,816 6,533 10,959 10,703
INCCAP > limitold 64.84 67.71 60.36 62.58 63.11 62.29
N 91 96 111 163 225 175
limitnew < INCCAP < limitold 62.67 58.46 62.50 69.72 64.02 65.08
N 225 195 232 284 478 315
Note: The table reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies for
different subpopulations. INCCAP denotes total capital income.
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Table 2.3: Tax incentives - difference-in-differences
treated non-treated Difference N
between
groups
Effect of the tax reform.
N 1,729 47,961 49,690
After the reform (1999-2001) 0.658 0.536 0.123 29,554
(0.014) (0.003) (0.015)
Before the reform (1996-1999) 0.613 0.548 0.066 20,136
(0.019) (0.004) (0.020)
Difference within groups 0.045 -0.012 0.057
(0.024) (0.005) (0.000)
Effect of the tax reform, INCCAP > limitnew.
N 1,729 861 2,590
After the reform (1999-2001) 0.658 0.627 0.031 1,640
(0.014) (0.020) (0.025)
Before the reform (1996-1999) 0.613 0.641 -0.028
(0.028) (0.019) (0.034) 950
Difference within groups 0.045 -0.014 0.059
(0.024) (0.035) (0.001)
Note: The upper panel reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies
for the years 1996-2001. The bottom panel reports averages for all households
with a capital income INCCAP > limitnew. The difference-in-difference estimate
is reported in bold face in the bottom right cell of each panel. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
Figure 2.2: The graph depicts the (smoothed) average life insurance ownership rate in East Germany,
1990. Source: GSOEP.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
in
 p
er
ce
nt
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age
Average life insurance ownership rate
Tax Incentives, Bequest Motives, and Life Insurance Demand 72
Table 2.4: Tax incentives - summary statistics
full sample INCCAP >
limitnew
marginal tax rate 0.249 0.338
woman D 0.376 0.277
age 48.87 52.39
children D 0.340 0.218
married D 0.829 0.730
10 years schooling D 0.280 0.250
13 years schooling D 0.200 0.424
college D 0.086 0.132
university D 0.100 0.240
self-employed D 0.057 0.136
civil servant D 0.045 0.070
retired D 0.283 0.320
unemployed D 0.078 0.035
Hhold income decile 1 D 0.099 0.026
Hhold income decile 2 D 0.103 0.039
Hhold income decile 3 D 0.097 0.054
Hhold income decile 4 D 0.101 0.070
Hhold income decile 6 D 0.111 0.100
Hhold income decile 7 D 0.097 0.078
Hhold income decile 8 D 0.097 0.111
Hhold income decile 9 D 0.099 0.174
Hhold income decile 10 D 0.094 0.284
owns house D 0.405 0.632
returns < 2,000 DM D 0.231
returns < 5,000 DM D 0.084
returns < 10,000 DM D 0.033
returns > 10,000 DM D 0.016
N 44,540 2,419
Sample years 1996-2001 1996-2001
Note: The samples are from the GSOEP. Demographic vari-
ables refer to the household head. Dummy variables are
marked by D.
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Table 2.5: Tax incentives - average marginal effects
(1) (2)
full sample INCCAP > limitnew
estimate st.error estimate st.error
τˆDiD D 0.052** (0.024) 0.089** (0.046)
T D 0.010 (0.006) -0.040 (0.037)
G D -0.006 (0.021) -0.057 (0.036)
marginal tax rate 0.329*** (0.026) 0.250*** (0.089)
woman D 0.003 (0.008) -0.075** (0.031)
age/10 0.153*** (0.017) 0.102* (0.056)
(age/10)2 -0.021*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.005)
children D -0.000 (0.009) 0.033 (0.035)
married D 0.062*** (0.012) 0.099*** (0.037)
10 years schooling D 0.059*** (0.009) -0.037 (0.035)
13 years schooling D 0.003 (0.012) -0.096*** (0.036)
college D 0.005 (0.014) 0.048 (0.039)
university D -0.024 (0.015) -0.002 (0.040)
self-employed D 0.044*** (0.014) 0.020 (0.041)
civil servant D 0.025 (0.018) -0.002 (0.048)
retired D -0.008 (0.013) -0.078* (0.044)
unemployed D -0.022** (0.011) 0.031 (0.057)
Hhold income decile 1 D -0.173*** (0.014) -0.035 (0.084)
Hhold income decile 2 D -0.082*** (0.013) 0.060 (0.063)
Hhold income decile 3 D -0.068*** (0.013) -0.018 (0.061)
Hhold income decile 4 D -0.040*** (0.011) 0.029 (0.051)
Hhold income decile 6 D 0.023** (0.011) 0.047 (0.047)
Hhold income decile 7 D 0.030** (0.012) 0.054 (0.050)
Hhold income decile 8 D 0.039*** (0.012) 0.045 (0.048)
Hhold income decile 9 D 0.044*** (0.013) 0.075 (0.046)
Hhold income decile 10 D 0.068*** (0.014) 0.156*** (0.041)
owns house D 0.071*** (0.008) 0.057* (0.029)
returns < 2,000 DM D 0.080*** (0.007)
returns < 5,000 DM D 0.034*** (0.011)
returns < 10,000 DM D 0.030* (0.016)
returns > 10,000 DM D 0.039 (0.026)
Suppressed: year dummies, constant.
N 44,540 2,419
Pseudo-R2 0.171 0.209
χ2 (prob.) 3,249.2 (0.000) 275.9 (0.000)
Sample years 1996-2001 1996-2001
D indicates dummy variables. Average marginal effects are reported. Robust
and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level.
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Table 2.6: Bequest motives - summary statistics
subsamples All observations
owner non-owner
Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 43.2 53.5 46.1 15.9 17 93
woman 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.50 0 1
married 0.77 0.53 0.70 0.46 0 1
10 years schooling 0.48 0.34 0.44 0.50 0 1
13 years schooling 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.35 0 1
master craftsman 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.27 0 1
college 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.39 0 1
university 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0 1
returns < 200 Mark 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.42 0 1
returns < 500 Mark 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.43 0 1
returns < 1,000 Mark 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.33 0 1
returns > 1,000 Mark 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.24 0 1
Hhold income/10,000 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.51
partner no job 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.32 0 1
partner income diff./1,000 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.43 0 3.63
retired 0.10 0.38 0.17 0.38 0 1
self-employed 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15 0 1
civil servant 0.31 0.19 0.27 0.45 0 1
owns house 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.45 0 1
owns weekend house 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.36 0 1
no car 0.36 0.56 0.42 0.49 0 1
motorbike 0.42 0.23 0.37 0.48 0 1
children 0.54 0.28 0.47 0.50 0 1
one child 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.42 0 1
two children 0.24 0.12 0.20 0.40 0 1
three children + 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.20 0 1
family very important 0.89 0.74 0.85 0.36 0 1
unsatisfied social benefits 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.50 0 1
security consciousness 8.83 8.75 8.81 1.83 0 10
Health satisfaction 6.80 6.25 6.65 2.64 0 10
classical concerts, theatre 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.32 0 1
pop concerts, movies, discos 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.36 0 1
active sports 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.35 0 1
meet friends, neighbors 0.58 0.66 0.64 0.48 0 1
help friends, neighbors 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50 0 1
attend church services 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.28 0 1
N 1487 562 2049
Note: The sample is the 1990 GSOEP for East Germany. Demographic variables
refer to the household head.
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Table 2.7: Bequest motives - average marginal effects
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
only <65
age/10 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.048
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.069)
(age/10)2 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
woman D 0.041** 0.041** 0.037* 0.045** 0.031
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
married D 0.024 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.010
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
10 years schooling D -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
13 years schooling D -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.007 -0.007
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
master craftsman D 0.034 0.034 0.027 0.036 -0.003
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
college D -0.046* -0.046* -0.049* -0.042 -0.041
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
university D -0.101** -0.100** -0.095* -0.096* -0.088*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
returns < 200 Mark D 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
returns < 500 Mark D 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
returns < 500 Mark D 0.070** 0.069** 0.071** 0.072** 0.063**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
returns > 1,000 Mark D -0.075 -0.075* -0.078* -0.069 -0.099**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Hhold income/10,000 D 2.102*** 2.106*** 1.776*** 2.115*** 2.054***
(0.532) (0.533) (0.539) (0.530) (0.564)
(Hhold income/10,000)2 -3.919*** -3.927*** -3.119** -3.938*** -3.613***
(1.249) (1.250) (1.268) (1.241) (1.299)
partner no job -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039)
partner income diff./1000 D 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
retired -0.045 -0.044 -0.053 -0.053 0.036
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056)
self-employed D 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.028 0.026
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056)
civil servant D 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.017
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
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. . . Table 2.7 continued . . .
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
only <65
owns house D 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
owns weekend house D 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
no car D 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
motorbike D 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.056***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
children D 0.070*** 0.063** 0.070*** 0.071***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
one child D 0.080***
(0.029)
two children D 0.068**
(0.032)
three children + D 0.071
(0.054)
family very important D 0.070** 0.077**
(0.028) (0.033)
unsatisfied social benefits D -0.006 0.006
(0.018) (0.019)
security conscious 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
health satisfaction -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
classical concerts, theatre D -0.038
(0.031)
pop concerts, movies, discos D 0.017
(0.028)
active sports D -0.036
(0.028)
meet friends, neighbors D 0.025
(0.020)
help friends, neighbors D 0.018
(0.019)
attend church services D -0.023
(0.035)
N 2,049 2,049 2,024 2,049 1,715
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.148 0.064
χ2 306.4 306.3 300.1 307.7 107.0
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 2,108.8 2,112.7 2,082.5 2,114.2 1,689.6
BIC 2,249.5 2,264.6 2,245.2 2,288.6 1,847.6
D indicates dummy variables. Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level.
Chapter 3
Do Investors Respond to Tax
Reform? Evidence from a Natural
Experiment in Germany1
3.1 Introduction
While theoretical models of portfolio decisions imply that households take into account
the after-tax return of each asset, empirical studies of the importance of tax incentives
provide ambiguous results (Poterba, 2002). Studies using data from cross-sections, as
for instance Poterba and Samwick (2003), typically face the difficulty of disentangling
genuine variation in income, for given tax rates, from genuine variation in after-tax
yields, for given income, because marginal tax rates are inherently linked to labor
income. Even studies that analyze the impact of tax reforms on the demand for life
insurance, which is in many developed countries one of the most tax-advantaged assets,
cannot provide conclusive evidence for the importance of tax incentives (Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2003).
We revisit the link between taxation and portfolio choice by analyzing households’
responses to a tax reform in Germany which revoked the tax exemption of life insurance
returns for all policies bought after January 1, 2005. Using a difference-in-differences
estimator on repeated cross-sectional data, we test if a treatment group of investors
that are affected by the new tax regime is more likely to own life insurance after the
reform than a control group of investors that are unaffected by the reform. We find
conclusive evidence that the reform was anticipated and that demand increased among
1This chapter is joint work together with Joachim Winter.
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households in the top tax quartile in the year before the tax exemption was abolished.
We proceed by discussing some key features of the reform in section 3.2. We describe
the data in section 3.3. The empirical analysis is presented in section 3.4 before we
conclude in section 3.5.
3.2 The Tax Reform of 2005
Life insurance is the second most popular financial asset in German households’ portfo-
lios, after savings accounts. In 2007, 15.6 percent of total private wealth, amounting to
716 billion Euro, was allocated to life insurance (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008). Around
49 percent of households own life insurance policies.2 One of the main reasons for this
unusually high popularity is the favored fiscal treatment of life insurance returns. Re-
turns have historically been fully exempt from taxation if the contract lasts for at least
12 years, premiums are paid during at least five years, and the term life insurance
component amounts to at least 60 percent of the total benefit paid out at the end of
the contract. However, due to a tax reform that was announced in mid-2004, returns of
all policies bought after January 1, 2005 are taxed at half the individual marginal tax
rate (under the above conditions). This reform was unanticipated and not intended
to offset group-specific trends in life insurance ownership. To illustrate the effect of
the announcement of the reform on life insurance demand, the left panel of figure 3.1
depicts an index of internet search volumes for the term Lebensversicherung (life in-
surance) in Germany, relative to the average search volume for this term between 2004
and 2008. Search volumes increased substantially during the months preceding the tax
reform. At the end of 2004, searches were three times larger than the average search
volume over the 2004–2008 period. The right panel of figure 1 shows life-insurance
sales in Germany over the 2000–2007 period. Sales of (tax-exempt) whole-life insur-
ance policies, which combine a term-life insurance contract with a savings plan, spike
in 2004, whereas sales of pure term-life insurance policies remain relatively constant
over the entire period. These graphs show that after the announcement of the reform,
households compared the conditions of different insurers (higher internet search vol-
ume) and acquired life insurance before the new tax regime came into effect (higher
sales volume only for whole-life insurance).
2Authors’ calculation based on the data from the GSOEP, described in section 3.3.
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Figure 3.1: Internet search volumes and sales of new contracts around the 2005 tax reform.
Sources: Google Trends (http://www.google.de/trends), left panel; Gesamtverband der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft (2008), right panel.
3.3 The Data
Our data are taken from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), the only dataset
containing annual information on life insurance ownership of German households
that covers pre- and post-reform years. The add-on package PanelWhiz for Stata
(http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for extracting our data from the GSOEP
files; see Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details.3 Our data span a before-reform
period (2000–2003) and the year when the reform was announced (2004). The depen-
dent variable in our subsequent analysis is life insurance holdings, defined as a binary
variable. Each year households are asked if they owned one or more life insurance
policies in the previous year. The independent variable of interest is the marginal tax
rate which is unobserved in the GSOEP data. We approximate marginal tax rates by
re-calculating each household’s taxable income from (estimated) tax payments, using
the official formulas of the federal tax office.4 A one unit change in taxable income is
3The Stata program generated by PanelWhiz to retrieve the data is available upon request. Any
data or computational errors are our own.
4The estimates of total tax payments provided by the GSOEP are based on Schwarze’s (1995)
approach. Schwarze adds up the incomes of all household members and applies standard deductions
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simulated in order to approximate the marginal tax rate. The socioeconomic charac-
teristics that are used as additional independent variables in our multivariate analysis
(see table 3.1 below) are naturally defined and refer to the household head.
3.4 Difference-in-Differences Estimates
As the post-reform tax regime links after-tax yields to marginal tax rates, households
in higher tax brackets are more likely to avoid taxation by preponing life insurance
purchases. Table 3.1 reports that the ownership rate was already very high (around
75.3 percent) in 2000–2003 among households in the top quartile of the marginal tax
distribution. Thus, we are most likely to observe changes at the intensive rather than
at the extensive margin. However, the GSOEP data do not provide information on the
amounts invested.
Table 3.1: Anticipation effect of the tax reform
treated non-treated Difference N
between
groups
N 14,997 42,184 57,181
Anticipating the reform (2004) 0.754 0.440 0.314 11,086
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
Before the reform (2000-2003) 0.753 0.460 0.293 46,095
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Difference within groups 0.001 -0.020 0.021
(0.009) (0.006) (0.000)
Note: The table reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies for
the years 2000–2004. The unconditional difference-in-difference estimate is
reported in bold face in the bottom right cell of the panel. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
We use the data in table 3.1 to compute an unconditional difference-in-differences
estimate of the effect on the taxpayer group that is most affected by the reform. The
ownership probability increased by 2.1 percent for households in the top quartile of
the marginal tax distribution. Next, we make sure that the estimate is bounded in
the [0; 1] interval and control for additional covariates that could account for different
behavior across groups. We denote individual i’s binary indicator for the treatment
group as Gi = 1{MTRit ≥MTR75t }, where MTR75t denotes the 75th percentile of the
marginal tax distribution in year t. We assume that group membership is exogenously
determined, i.e., households did not change marginal tax brackets as a result of the
reform itself. Ti = 1{t ≥ 2004} defines a time dummy for the reform year. To ease
the notational burden, we introduce the shorthand Yi∈g,t for Yi|Gi = g, Ti = t. The
based on the socioeconomic status of the household.
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potential outcomes with and without treatment are Y 1i and Y
0
i respectively. Based on
the standard probit difference-in-differences model
P (Yi = 1|Gi, Ti,xi) = Φ(αTi + βGi + γTiGi + xiδ), (3.1)
where xi is a vector of additional independent variables with coefficients δ, Puhani
(2008) shows that a consistent estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated
is
τ̂DiD = E[Y 1i∈1,1|xi]− E[Y 0i∈1,1|xi] (3.2)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Φ
(
α̂ + β̂ + γ̂ + xiδ̂
)
− Φ
(
α̂ + β̂ + xiδ̂
)]
.
We apply the delta method to infer statistical significance of the average treatment
effect in small samples. Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for the additional co-
variates. Also, average marginal effects for the probability to hold one or more life
insurance policies are reported for continuous and dummy variables. Our estimate of
the average treatment effect on the treated, τ̂DiD, remains similar to the unconditional
estimate when controlling for other potential determinants of life insurance demand
and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
3.5 Conclusion
The abolishment of tax favors for life insurance bought in Germany after January 1,
2005 triggered last-minute purchases in anticipation of the reform. At the extensive
margin, life insurance demand increased by 2 percent among households in the top tax
quartile. However, the increase of internet search volumes in late 2004 suggests that
changes at the intensive margin, for which coherent data is not available, are likely to
be larger. Our results contrast with Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003) who cannot find that
tax incentives matter for life insurance demand in Italy. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that insurance sales agents exploited the favorable market situation in Germany in
2004, whereas Italian insurers lacked the vital initiative to point out the effects of the
tax reform among potential investors.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics and probit estimates
Summary statistics Average marginal effects
owners non-owners estimate st.error
τ̂DiD D 0.07 0.02 0.020** (0.010)
T D 0.19 0.20 -0.020*** (0.006)
G D 0.36 0.12 0.049*** (0.009)
woman D 0.33 0.42 -0.006 (0.007)
age/10 4.66 5.52 0.159*** (0.016)
(age/10)2 23.4 33.7 -0.022*** (0.002)
children D 0.39 0.21 -0.021*** (0.008)
married D 0.84 0.81 0.048*** (0.011)
10 years schooling D 0.33 0.23 0.041*** (0.008)
13 years schooling D 0.29 0.20 -0.009 (0.011)
college D 0.11 0.07 0.020 (0.013)
university D 0.15 0.09 -0.003 (0.013)
self-employed D 0.09 0.04 0.028** (0.013)
civil servant D 0.07 0.03 -0.003 (0.016)
retired D 0.16 0.46 -0.070*** (0.013)
unemployed D 0.05 0.09 -0.080*** (0.011)
Hhold income decile 1 D 0.04 0.17 -0.235*** (0.012)
Hhold income decile 2 D 0.06 0.15 -0.123*** (0.012)
Hhold income decile 3 D 0.07 0.13 -0.099*** (0.012)
Hhold income decile 4 D 0.09 0.12 -0.053*** (0.011)
Hhold income decile 6 D 0.13 0.10 0.032*** (0.010)
Hhold income decile 7 D 0.11 0.07 0.043*** (0.011)
Hhold income decile 8 D 0.13 0.06 0.061*** (0.012)
Hhold income decile 9 D 0.13 0.05 0.071*** (0.012)
Hhold income decile 10 D 0.14 0.04 0.120*** (0.013)
owns house D 0.27 0.19 0.069*** (0.007)
returns < 2,000 DM D 0.11 0.08 0.073*** (0.007)
returns < 5,000 DM D 0.05 0.03 0.043*** (0.010)
returns < 10,000 DM D 0.03 0.02 0.048*** (0.014)
returns > 10,000 DM D 0.53 0.38 0.022 (0.017)
Suppressed: year dummies, constant.
N 27,289 23,385 50,674
Pseudo-R2 0.180
χ2 (prob.) 3,733.6 (0.000)
Sample years 2000-2004
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. The depen-
dent variable is 1 if the households owns one or more life insurance policies and
zero otherwise. D indicates dummy variables. Average marginal effects are
reported. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Chapter 4
Adopting to New Financial
Products: Evidence from the
Demand for Building Society
Contracts in East Germany
4.1 Introduction
The rising importance of financial services in modern economies and a high pace of fi-
nancial innovation foster the interest in the determinants of financial innovation. While
several studies analyze supply-side factors driving the introduction of new financial
tools, empirical studies of the determinants of households’ adoption to new financial
products are relatively rare. The only two examples of studies assessing investor be-
havior, which are listed in the recent overview paper by Frame and White (2004), are
Mantel (2000) and Mantel and McHugh (2001). The authors study who first uses elec-
tronic bill payment and debit card services. They find that usage is positively related
to age, income, and gender (female). This dearth of empirical research on adoption
processes to new financial products is mainly due to the lack of accessible data that
allows analyzing investor behavior.
This paper contributes to the literature by studying a unique natural experiment
in the German financial market. For the first time in 1990, East Germans had the op-
portunity to save into building society contracts (BSCs) after 40 years of communism.
As both home ownership and wealth were low in the former East Germany, BSCs were
an attractive new financial product for people of all age groups to fulfill their dream
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of an own home by starting to save for the downpayment of a mortgage. This paper
analyzes (i) who uses BSCs to save for a house purchase, and (ii) how long it takes
after reunification until future BSC investors start to save into BSCs.
BSCs are a subsidized and tax-favored savings product that facilitates saving for
downpayments of mortgage credits. They offer a savings plan with a predetermined
value and interest rate. If the investor accumulated half of the contract’s value, the
building society typically allocates credit for the remaining value.
Given the importance of BSCs in the portfolios of German households, studying
the adoption to BSCs in East Germany can improve our understanding as to why some
households postpone investing into financial products they will eventually own. We
find that households with close ties to their families in the West (which were aware
of the features of BSCs) invest earlier, pointing to the presence of information asym-
metries and the importance of social networks in the adoption process. This is in line
with Hong, Kubik, Stein (2004), who show that social investors have lower entry costs
into stock markets. There is also evidence that households trade-off long-term savings
goals for short-term consumption, because households owning a car already in 1990
are more likely to invest into BSCs and to do so earlier. Life insurance appears to be
a substitute for BSCs, which is not surprising, given that both provide a tax-favored
means to accumulate savings over the long-term.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2, the data used in
this study is presented. The empirical methodology applies a split-population survival
model, which is discussed in section 4.3. Results from the estimation are reported in
section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Owner-occupied housing typically accounts for a major share of households’ wealth
holdings and is the largest financial transaction conducted by most households during
their lifetime. For instance, around 80% of US households are house owners, investing
47 percent of their wealth into real estate (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). The current
financial crisis, which began in the US housing market, illustrates the crucial impact
of people’s house financing decisions on the economy as a whole. Before the financial
crisis, cheap credit encouraged banks to reduce downpayment requirements, so that
potential home owners could raise mortgages that were solely backed by the face value
of the house they acquired. Such times are over now, so that the eligibility for mort-
gage credit will again depend on a household’s ability to first pay a downpayment out
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of its savings. BSCs combine a savings plan for the downpayment with a traditional
mortgage contract.
Figure 4.1 depicts average ownership rates of owner-occupied housing and BSCs
for East and West Germany. Between 1990 and 2006, ownership rates were relatively
stable in West Germany with a constant wedge between house and BSC ownership.
In the East, only around 26 percent of the population owned a house or apartment in
1990. After reunification, house ownership picked up only slowly. However, the adap-
tion to BSCs happened quickly, so that in 1994 nearly as many East as West Germans
invested into BSCs.
The data used in this study come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP),
which is a longitudinal survey of private households in Germany.1 The subsample cov-
ering the territory of the former GDR started in 1990. The GSOEP contains data on
the ownership of BSCs in each year. As BSCs were not available before 1990, all house-
holds from the initial sample can be observed as either saving or not saving into BSCs
at some point during the 17 years following reunification. The dependent variable in all
regressions is the number of years since 1990 until first BSC ownership. For households
not owning BSCs throughout the entire sampling period, the dependent variable is set
to 17. Several households also drop out of the sample before the sampling period ends.
Most of these early drop-outs occurred during the first three sampling years. In total,
the sample consists of 1774 households.
Figure 4.2 provides non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard and sur-
vivor functions. The non-parametric survival function in figure 4.2 reaches a limit at
around 0.35, corresponding to the proportion of the sample that had never invested
into BSCs until the last year of observation. The non-parametric estimate of the haz-
ard function resembles closely to hazards from a continuous-time parametric model. In
what follows, we thus limit ourselves to modeling a continuous-time split-population
duration model.2
We explain ownership probabilities and duration based on the initial characteris-
tics of the household at reunification. Summary statistics of the explanatory variables
are reported in table 4.1. We use dummies for age, gender, martial status, education,
income, and wealth. Figure 4.3 depicts age and cohort effects. There is strong indi-
cation that households that were older than 60 years in 1990 did not save for buying
a house anymore. In contrast, differences in age seem to be negligible for the younger
1The Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for ex-
tracting the data. See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO
file to retrieve the data used here is available upon request.
2Discrete-time split-population models, as proposed by Stephen Jenkins (spsurv), show very poor
convergence properties.
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generations.
Determinants of adoption behavior that are of particular interest are information
asymmetries and consumption-savings trade-offs. We study if households adopt quicker
to BSCs if they owned a house, car, or life insurance in 1990, or received gifts from
their relatives. Figure 4.4 shows that house owners were more likely to invest into
BSCs. Given the bad condition of many estates, BSCs provided a subsidized and tax-
favored tool to save for the renovation of owner-occupied homes. The difference in BSC
ownership is most pronounced among households with a car. Initial car owners have
a much higher BSC ownership rate, indicating that consumption was more important
to most households than long-term savings goals. Similarly, households receiving gifts
from relatives in the West are slightly more likely to invest into BSCs. However, life
insurance ownership is strongly negatively correlated with savings into BSCs due to
the substitutability of both financial products.
4.3 Methodology
For the BSC-investors in the sample, we use the reported age of first ownership, so
that the duration can be interpreted as a complete spell. However, 49 percent of the
observations in the sample are not buying BSCs in any of the 17 years we observe. In
a parametric duration model, these observations would be interpreted as incomplete,
right-censored spells, assuming that these individuals will eventually fail and buy BSCs.
Therefore, we use the split-population model proposed by Foster and Jones (2000),
which applies the duration process only to those individuals that are predicted to
eventually invest into BSCs. Defining b = 1 for a household that will eventually invest
into BSCs and modeling eventual failure by using a probit specification yields:
P(eventually invest into BSCs)= P (b = 1|zi) = Φ(α′zi)
P(never invest into BSCs) = P (b = 0|zi) = 1− Φ(α′zi),
where zi is a vector of covariates for household i. The probability of investing into
BSCs at a given time t is then defined conditionally on an eventual investment. Based
on standard model selection criteria (table 4.2) for the unconditional case as well as
Cox-Snell residuals (figure 4.5), we choose a log-logistic distribution to model dura-
tion. We use the plots of the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals to assess the general fit
of the models. A correctly fitted model should yield cumulative Cox-Snell residuals
which resemble a sample from a standard exponential distribution. A plot of the non-
parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for these data should therefore
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lie on a 450 degree line through the origin. We find the best fit for a log-logistic func-
tion, for which the Cox-Snell residuals are closest to the diagonal.
In order to check if also the proportional hazard assumption holds for the variables
of interest, Jenkins (2005) suggests to take recourse to the log-odds survival interpre-
tation of the log-logistic function. For a non-parametric (Kaplan-Meier product-limit)
estimate of the survivor function, S(.), the log-odds property suggests that a plot of
ln( S(t,xi)
1−S(t,xi)) against ln(t), should be a straight line if the log-logistic model is appro-
priate. If plotted separately for two different groups classified by combinations of xi,
the lines should move parallel. Figure 4.6 shows that the log-odds of survival plots are
straight, which confirms the choice of the log-logistic model of duration. In addition,
the lines are parallel in all four cases, suggesting that the variables of interest affect
the hazard proportionally.
The probability density function f(.) and the survival function S(.) of the log-
logistic distribution for those households eventually starting to invest are respectively
f(t|b = 1,xi) = λ
1
γ t
1
γ
−1
γ[1 + (λt
1
γ )]2
(4.1)
S(t|b = 1,xi) = 1
1 + λt
1
γ
, (4.2)
where λ = exp(−β′xi), xi is a vector of time-invariant covariates and γ is a scale
parameter. For identification, zi includes in addition to the variables included in vector
xi also a variable that is 1 if a the interview in 1990 lasted for more than 15 minutes
and zero otherwise. We expect that the 41% of households taking less than 15 minutes
to answer the survey are most likely to drop out during the first waves. This provides
identification of the probit regression as long as disinterest in participating in the survey
is orthogonal to the decision to save into BSCs. The log-likelihood contributions for
the split population model then become:
L = ci ln[f(t|b = 1,xi)] + (1− ci) ln[1− Φ(α′zi) + Φ(α′zi)S(t|b = 1,xi)]. (4.3)
For those who are observed as BSC-investors, ci = 1, the contribution is simply the
probability density function of investing at some point, Φ(α′zi), multiplied by the prob-
ability density function of the observed starting date of the contract, f(.). For those
who are observed as not starting (including right-censored observations), ci = 0, the
contribution is the logarithm of the probability of never saving into BSCs, 1−Φ(α′zi),
plus the probability of investing after the last observed survey date, Φ(α′zi)S(.).
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4.4 Results
The results of the estimation are presented in table 4.3. There is indeed evidence
that age has a significantly negative impact on BSC ownership among older investors.
Households older than 65 years at reunification are 22 percentage points less likely to
invest into BSCs. We find little indication that gender, martial status, or education
effect ownership of BSCs.
While initial financial wealth does not have a significant impact on BSC ownership,
households with higher labor income are more likely to invest into BSCs. Moreover,
initial house owners are more likely to save in BSCs, whereas life insurance ownership
in 1990 has a significantly negative impact on investment into BSC. This supports the
idea that life insurance and BSCs are partial substitutes. Finally, households taking
more than 15 minutes to answer the questionnaire are less likely to drop out early,
confirming the validity of our instrument.
Regarding the timing of the investment decision, households with an upper medium
income invest earlier. Furthermore, house and car ownership in 1990 reduces the time
until a household starts to save via BSCs. Households receiving gifts from relatives are
also more likely to invest relatively early, although the estimate is only significant at the
10 percent level. Figure 4.7 shows graphically that the estimated hazard probabilities
for initial house owners, car owners and gift receivers have a higher-than-average hazard
probability, while life insurance owners have a lower-than-average hazard probability.
4.5 Conclusion
Despite the importance of financial innovation for modern economies, determinants of
the adoption process of investors to new financial products have so far received little
attention by researchers. In this paper, we argue that German reunification provides
a natural experiment to study ownership and the timing of investments into BSCs.
After 1990, East German households could decide to use BSCs in order to save for the
downpayment of a mortgage and when to do so. Overall, households adopt quickly to
this new savings product and ownership rates catched up to West German levels.
The evidence presented points towards the importance of information networks
and consumption-savings trade-offs in savings decisions. We find that households with
close ties to their families in West Germany take less time until they start saving
into BSCs, suggesting that information and financial help from relatives in the West
facilitate BSC investments. We also find strong indication that long-term investments
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are traded-off for short-term consumption goals, as initial car owners are more likely
to own BSCs and invest earlier. Life insurance, however, appears to be a substitute for
BSCs. Contrary to what the literature on financial literacy would suggest, however, we
find no differences in ownership and duration with regard to education characteristics
of the households.
Adopting to New Financial Products 91
References
Forster, Martin and Andrew Jones (2000): “The Role of Tobacco Taxes in
Starting and Quitting Smoking: Duration Analysis of British Data,” Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, 164, 517-547.
Frame, Scott W. and Lawrence J. White (2004): “Empirical Studies of Finan-
cial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?,” Journal of Economic Literature,
42, 116-144.
Haisken-DeNew, John P. and Markus Hahn (2006): “PanelWhiz: A Flexible
Modularized Stata Interface for Accessing Large Scale Panel Data Sets,” mimeo,
(http:// www.PanelWhiz.eu).
Hong, Harrison; Jeffrey D. Kubik and Jeremy C. Stein (2004): “Social
Interaction and Stock Market Participation,” Journal of Finance, 59, 137-163.
Jenkins, Stephen (2005): Survival Analysis. Manuscript, University of Essex,
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/teaching/degree/stephenj/ec968/index.php.
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia Mitchell (2007): “Baby Boomer Retirement
Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 205-224.
Mantel, Brian (2000): “Why Do Consumers Pay Bills Electronically? An Empirical
Analysis,” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 4, 32-47.
Mantel, Brian and Timothy McHugh (2001): “Competition and Innovation in
the Consumer e-Payments Market? Considering Demand, Supply, and Public
Policy Issues,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Emerging Payments Occasional
Working Paper Series, EPS-2001-4.
Adopting to New Financial Products 92
Figures and Tables
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
ra
te
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Contract West Contract East
Apartment West Apartment East
House savings and ownership
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
cohort 35-44 1774 0.21 0.41 0 1
cohort 45-54 1774 0.21 0.40 0 1
cohort 55-64 1774 0.14 0.34 0 1
cohort 65+ 1774 0.14 0.35 0 1
woman 1774 0.51 0.50 0 1
married 1774 0.91 0.28 0 1
10 years schooling 1774 0.45 0.50 0 1
13 years schooling 1774 0.15 0.35 0 1
college 1774 0.28 0.45 0 1
income quintile 2 1774 0.20 0.40 0 1
income quintile 3 1774 0.20 0.40 0 1
income quintile 4 1774 0.20 0.40 0 1
income quintile 5 1774 0.19 0.39 0 1
wealth < 6,000 1774 0.19 0.40 0 1
wealth < 15,000 1774 0.17 0.38 0 1
wealth < 30,000 1774 0.07 0.26 0 1
wealth 30,000+ 1774 0.05 0.21 0 1
kids 1774 0.46 0.50 0 1
house in 1990 1774 0.31 0.46 0 1
car in 1990 1774 0.61 0.49 0 1
life insurance in 1990 1774 0.26 0.44 0 1
gifts from west 1774 0.24 0.43 0 1
interview > 15 min. 1774 0.59 0.49 0 1
Table 4.2: Model choice
Model Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC
Exponential 1774 -2303.8 -2057.4 23 4160.8 4286.8
Weibull 1774 -2291.8 -2056.1 24 4160.3 4291.8
Gompertz 1774 -2239.0 -2023.0 24 4093.9 4225.4
log-logistic 1774 -2235.7 -1979.0 24 4005.9 4137.5
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Table 4.3: Split-population regression
Hazard Probit
estimate st.err. estimate st.err marginal st.err
effect
cohort 35-44 -0.023 (0.099) -0.161 (0.167) -0.026 (0.030)
cohort 45-54 -0.104 (0.128) -0.493*** (0.187) -0.089 (0.043)
cohort 55-64 0.300* (0.177) -0.675*** (0.213) -0.140 (0.057)
cohort 65+ 0.398* (0.241) -0.963*** (0.252) -0.224 (0.077)
woman 0.087 (0.072) 0.102 (0.104) 0.016 (0.015)
married -0.389* (0.200) -0.145 (0.285) -0.021 (0.045)
10 years schooling -0.135 (0.107) -0.100 (0.143) -0.016 (0.024)
13 years schooling -0.140 (0.139) -0.353* (0.198) -0.063 (0.042)
college -0.110 (0.088) 0.134 (0.138) 0.020 (0.019)
income quintile 2 -0.257 (0.170) 0.245 (0.191) 0.035 (0.023)
income quintile 3 -0.172 (0.166) 0.435** (0.202) 0.059 (0.020)
income quintile 4 -0.368** (0.168) 0.271 (0.198) 0.039 (0.024)
income quintile 5 -0.215 (0.173) 0.635*** (0.223) 0.082 (0.019)
wealth < 6,000 0.096 (0.093) 0.054 (0.134) 0.008 (0.020)
wealth < 15,000 0.095 (0.096) 0.202 (0.145) 0.029 (0.018)
wealth < 30,000 0.096 (0.136) 0.171 (0.200) 0.024 (0.026)
wealth 30,000+ 0.353 (0.215) 0.255 (0.292) 0.034 (0.033)
kids -0.151 (0.099) 0.249* (0.148) 0.039 (0.020)
house in 1990 -0.417*** (0.074) 0.401*** (0.116) 0.059 (0.013)
car in 1990 -0.183** (0.091) 0.223* (0.121) 0.036 (0.017)
life insurance in 1990 0.195* (0.105) -0.365*** (0.127) -0.065 (0.027)
gifts from west -0.130* (0.078) 0.128 (0.117) 0.019 (0.016)
interview > 15 min. 0.223** (0.095) 0.036 (0.013)
constant 2.247*** (0.218) 0.184 (0.295)
shape 0.547*** (0.019)
N 1774
ll -2851.98
χ2 116.61
AIC 5799.95
BIC 6063.04
Note: Significant at the * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.
Chapter 5
Talking Trade: Language Barriers
in Intra-Canadian Commerce
5.1 Introduction
In the light of falling tariffs and transport cost, the importance of institutional barriers
to trade has captured much attention in recent research.1 The existence of a language
barrier in trade has been documented in numerous empirical studies. Rose (2000)
finds that countries sharing a common language trade 1.5 times more with each other.
Anderson and van Windcoop (2004) estimate that the tax equivalent of the language
barrier amounts to seven percent.
While gravity models of aggregate trade flows find robust evidence for the language
barrier, these models remain silent on the question of the channel through which lan-
guage affects trade. It is even questionable if language should affect international trade
at all, given that international trade flows consist mainly of manufactures. Yet in order
to trade two manufacturing goods between for example the US and China only one
translator is required, whose services are unlikely to affect total trading cost. Also
the fact that with China and Japan two countries with relatively few fluent English
speakers are among the top five trading nations contradicts the importance of language
for manufacturing trade. Services trade, on the other hand, often requires the ability
of both the service provider and his customer to communicate directly with each other.
A second shortcoming of the studies mentioned above is their opaque measurement
of the language barrier, which is typically represented as either a binary indicator for
countries that share a common official language (e.g. Frankel and Rose 2002), or as
1Recent examples are Rauch (2002), Nunn (2007), and Levchenko (2007).
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the probability that two randomly chosen people from two countries share a common
mother tongue (e.g. Melitz, 2008). Alternatively, Hutchinson (2002) and Ku and Zuss-
man (2008) suggest to use the fluency in English - the lingua franca of international
trade - as a proxy for the ability of natives from two countries to communicate in a
common third language. Yet what is really required for trade is that there is a suffi-
cient number of people in both countries who are proficient in at least one of the other’s
language(s), irrespective of whether they speak a lingua franca, the same official, na-
tive, or second language. Also, the common proxies might take up all other kinds of
bilateral institutional similarities, thereby imposing an upward bias on the estimate for
the language barrier in gravity models.
This paper provides one way to resolve the missing motivation of the language bar-
rier and to reduce measurement bias of the effect of language on trade. In particular,
I test if communication-intensive industries trade more between Canadian provinces
with a good knowledge of the other’s language(s) compared to those industries that
require less communication with the trading partner. Such a finding could justify the
alleged role of language as a trade barrier. Though it is less general than conventional
gravity models, this simple approach has two advantages: First, it tests for one specific
mechanism through which language affects trade. Second, it corrects for other institu-
tional factors that could bias the estimates via fixed-bilateral effects between Canadian
provinces.
Previous work that comes closest to this paper is from Fink et al. (2005), who show
that trade is significantly lower between countries with high bilateral international call-
ing prices. They find that the price effect is larger for trade in differentiated products
compared to goods that are traded over organized exchanges, which corroborates the
hypothesis that trade in communication-intensive goods is more sensitive to deficiencies
in direct communication. However, they estimate that halving the importer’s calling
prices would boost aggregate trade by 42.5%, which seems unreasonably high. Melitz
(2008) estimates the effect of sharing a common mother tongue on international trade
flows. In contrast to my paper, Melitz’s variables on language commonality do not
measure the knowledge of second languages. My measure incorporates the two-sided
knowledge of English, French, and Chinese as first or second languages between Cana-
dian provinces, which is a better proxy for the language-trade link, as the empirical
evidence in section 5.3 shows. So far, only Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2008) use data on
the actual knowledge of foreign languages in the Europe. Yet their estimates are based
on aggregate trade flows, so that they cannot attribute the effects to a specific channel
through which language erects a trade barrier.
My results suggest that commerce in industries that require direct communication
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for trade increases with the probability that people in another Canadian province speak
the same language. I cannot find evidence for an impact of indirect communication via
mail or advertising on intra-Canadian trade flows. The estimates imply that Canada’s
minority language regions face a potential burden from expensive services exports and
imports.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 5.2 the estimation
equation is motivated. Section 5.3 describes the data. In section 5.4, the baseline
results are discussed. In section 5.5, I control for potential endogeneity. Section 5.6
consists of robustness checks. Finally, section 5.7 wraps up the discussion. A detailed
description of the variable labels is provided in table 5.8.
5.2 Empirical Model
While there is strong support for the language barrier in empirical research, hardly any
theoretical work has analyzed this issue, probably because it seems self-evident that
people can only trade if they are able to communicate with each other. Yet the case
for language in trade is not clear-cut: For instance, while rice or oil can be bought at
the merchandise exchange without the need to learn any Asian or Arabic languages, a
buyer of a laptop will require explanations, software, and support services in a language
he speaks. To see exactly how language can affect trade patterns, imagine the following
scenario: There are two regions, whose populations speak different languages. Transla-
tion is costly. If some products require more communication between buyer and seller
for trade to proceed, translation cost will more adversely affect trade in those prod-
ucts. If more people learn the other’s language, total translation cost will fall. Hence,
I propose the following hypothesis: ceteris paribus, a high language commonality be-
tween two regions should disproportionately help communication-intensive industries
to trade.
With respect to the type of communication used, I distinguish between direct or
spoken communication and indirect or written communication. Direct communication
is expected to have a larger effect on the volume of trade than indirect communication,
because total translation costs are higher for direct communication, which cannot be
replicated but has to occur simultaneously. Hence, direct communication-intensive in-
dustries are more likely to be affected by the language barrier.
This study focuses on Canada, which is the only OECD country with more than
one official language for which detailed inter-regional data on trade flows is available.
While this choice limits the scope of the study and the number of potential sources
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of language variation, it offers at least three advantages. Firstly, the relative unifor-
mity of Canada’s legal and social system alleviates institutional bias that is possibly
present in studies of international trade. As communication-intensive industries are of-
ten contract-intensive as well, estimates from cross-country regressions would be likely
to incorporate effects of comparative advantage in regions with sound legal institutions
(Nunn 2007). Secondly, it downweights the possibility that my language estimates cap-
ture some home bias (or border) effects that are well-known to the international trade
literature.2 Hummels and Hillberry (2003) showed that intra-US trade is unlikely to
suffer from intra-national border effects.3 Similarly, Combes et al. (2003) estimate that
in France more than 60% of the potential intra-national home bias can be explained
by internal migration and cultural networks. Such network effects between Canadian
provinces and territories are likely to be primarily determined by linguistic differences,
since Helliwell (1997) already pointed out that internal migration has little trade cre-
ating effect within Canada. Finally, the arguments presented above for the existence
of a language-trade channel should be mainly relevant for service-intensive industries.
Therefore I refrain from studying intra-European trade (which otherwise would make a
perfect case for the language-trade link), because services are not sufficiently liberalized
across EU members (e.g. Kox and Lejour 2005; Kox and Lejour 2006).
This paper introduces a new way to thinking about the gravity model of trade,
which rests on the work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Romalis (2004), and Nunn
(2007). These papers use industry- and cross-country-variation to identify sources of a
country’s comparative advantage across industries. I adapt their approach for a single
country setting, where I exploit trade variation across industries and bilateral province
pairings. Specifically, I eliminate any variation, which is not needed to test the main
hypothesis: trade in communication-intensive industries is higher between provinces
with a higher language commonality. The model I estimate is then:
ln tradeijk = δij + δk + β1 ln(transkdistij) + β2prodijk + β3cklangij + ²ijk, (5.1)
where ln tradeijk is the natural logarithm of the bilateral trade flow from province
i to province j in industry k. The fixed-bilateral effects δij pick up all trade vari-
ation for each country pairing that is constant across industries. Similarly, δk are
industry fixed-effects that are constant across bilateral trade flows. Compared to
the traditional gravity model, the bilateral fixed-effects do not allow to use variables
that are constant across country pairings. Thus, the impact of distance on trade is
2See McCullum (1995), Helliwell (1996).
3Wolf’s (2000) dataset does not properly account for intra-US trade distances and wholesale trade
flows.
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proxied with the log of the interaction between the transport-intensity of a sector,
transk, and distance, distij. In order to capture differences in comparative advantage,
prodijk =
productionik
GDPi
− productionjk
GDPj
reflects differences in the structure of production be-
tween two provinces. The main variable of interest is the interaction of ck and langij,
in which ck reflects the need for communication and langij stands for the language
commonality between two provinces. ²ijk is a random error. As common in the litera-
ture (e.g. Anderson and van Windcoop 2003; Melitz 2008), I assume that imports and
exports are affected symmetrically by the interaction effects.
The approach here is conceptually different from industry-level gravity models that
estimate the semi-elasticity of the language commonality with respect to trade (e.g.
Deardorff 1998; Hummels 2001). The bilateral fixed-effects capture the direct effect of
the language commonality on the volume of trade in my estimation equation. Hence,
the coefficient of interest β3 only captures the effect that language commonality has
on the pattern of trade and provides no direct interpretation as a semi-elasticity of the
language barrier.
The estimates of (5.1) should not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the
language-trade channel. First, there may be determinants of trade that are omitted
from (5.1). As a matter of fact Canada’s English speaking provinces tend to be richer
and domicile more Protestants than Catholics compared to their French speaking coun-
terparts. Therefore, a primary concern is that cklangij may be simply capturing the
fact that wealth and religion shape intra-Canadian trade patterns. I carefully control
for these alternative determinants of the language-trade channel. Second, the direction
of causality implied by equation (5.1) may be wrong. If trade fosters the adoption
of the other’s language, causality might run from trade to language. In consequence,
estimates of β3 may be biased. In section 5.5, I instrument for language variation that
is unaffected by this feedback effect. Finally, this paper concentrates on the analysis of
positive exports and imports. Thus the interpretation of the estimates is conditional
on a province trading in an industry, thereby disregarding the effect of language on the
decision to enter an industry. I check for the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion
of zero trade in section 5.6.
5.3 The Data
The most disaggregated inter-provincial trade data available for Canada are at the
2-digit industry level. The data comprise all recorded (non-zero) inter-regional trade
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flows of Canada’s ten provinces and three territories for the year 2001.4 The final data
classify in 38 industries that comprise agriculture, manufacturing and service indus-
tries. For numerous reasons, I study trade across all sectors, which is different from
other studies that solely focus on manufacturing trade (e.g. Nunn 2007; Romalis 2004;
Hummels 2001). The first reason is that Canada’s internal trade differs from inter-
national trade, where services trade is negligible compared to manufactures. In 2001,
service trade accounted for 56.7% of total intra-Canadian trade flows. The second rea-
son is that the language channel should be present across all sectors of the economy.
Particularly, the service sector is likely to be more language-sensitive than manufac-
tures. So leaving out one of the sectors would narrow the scope of this study.
Provincial gross domestic products in current prices as well as population estimates
have been retrieved from the Statistics Canada home-page. The distance variable
is from Feenstra (2004), who provides distances between the capitals of Canadian
provinces. I added distances for each pairing that involves trade with the three terri-
tories, using the respective longitudes and latitudes.
5.3.1 Language Variables
In contrast to the language proxies used in previous studies, this paper measures lan-
guage commonality as the probability that any two people from different provinces
picked at random will be able to communicate with each other.5 This variable is more
in line with theory, because trade only requires a sufficient knowledge of the trading
partner’s language in order to reduce translation costs.
The measure of language commonality between provinces is constructed from the
Census survey. The survey asks for mother tongue, knowledge of official languages,
and use of languages at work. Table 5.1 depicts the percentage of speakers of English
and French as a mother tongue in Canadian provinces. While English is the dominant
mother tongue (59.5%), 22.7% of the Canadian population are native French speak-
ers. French mother tongue speakers, are mainly concentrated in Quebec (81.2% French
mother tongue speakers) and New Brunswick (32.9%).
The statistics show clearly that the language barrier cannot be represented by the
distribution of mother tongues within the population: 17.6% of all Canadians have a
mother tongue different from the two official languages. Yet only 1.5% of all Canadians
4Although industry-level trade data is available from 1997 to 2004, Census data is only available
for the years 1996 and 2001. For a discussion of the derivation of inter-provincial trade flows from
IO-tables, see Ge´ne´reux and Langen (2002).
5For an excellent overview of language measures used in previous research, see Melitz (2008).
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are unable to speak at least one of the two official languages. Across provinces, only the
Inuit population in the Nunavut territories constitutes an exception with 13.1% of the
population knowing neither English nor French. While in most provinces more than
97% of the population speaks English as first or second language, Quebec (45.4%) and
New Brunswick (90.7%) are the two exceptions with relatively few English speakers.6
In addition, I control for potential Chinese networks within Canada that have been
shown to affect international trade flows (Rauch 2002). With 2.7%, Canada’s Chinese
minority supplies the third largest language group of Canada’s working population.
Different from other minorities, 42% of speakers with a ’Chinese’ mother tongue also
use non-official languages often or sometimes at work. As a proxy for the knowledge
of a Chinese language, I use the population share with Chinese origin.
For each bilateral pairing ij, the variable for language commonality is constructed
as follows :
langij =
L∑
l=1
(knowledgel)i(knowledge
l)j, (5.2)
where l = {English, French,′Chinese′}. English is the sum of people knowing En-
glish and people knowing English and French, divided by the total population of the
province. The French and ′Chinese′ measures are constructed similarly. Due to data
limitations and the fact that indigenous languages are not used outside the three ter-
ritories, I do not consider native languages separately. langij is not bounded at one,
since people may be fluent in several languages. However, I restrict the probability
that two randomly chosen people are able to communicate with each other to one in
cases where I calculate values slightly larger than one. Based on equation (5.2), I also
construct a measure for religious (denominational) commonality, where l={Anglicans,
Baptists, Buddhists, Catholics, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, United church}.
Table 5.1 depicts the resulting language commonality for all bilateral country pair-
ings. The pairings range from Quebec and Nunavut, where the probability that two
randomly chosen people understand each other is 43.1%, to Saskatchewan and Prince
Edward Island, where everybody speaks the same language. Virtually all variation
in language knowledge comes from the two French speaking provinces and the ter-
ritories, whereas the pairing Ontario/British Columbia exhibits the lowest language
commonality (0.962) among the English speaking provinces.
6Unfortunately, the data do not allow to draw explicit conclusions on the fluency of language
knowledge. Yet Hutchinson (2002) cannot find a statistically significant difference between speakers
of English as a mother tongue or second language, when analyzing the volume of US exports and
imports.
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5.3.2 Communication-intensities of Industries
Identification hinges on a careful choice of ck, the proxy for differences in the industry-
specific need of direct and indirect communication between importer and exporter.
Rauch (1999) classifies manufacturing goods on whether they are traded on an ex-
change, reference priced or neither of both. However, I refrain from using his classifi-
cation for two reasons. Firstly, it only captures manufacturing goods, yet the services
sector is an important pillar of intra-Canadian trade that accounts for much of the
language-related variation, as will be seen below. Secondly, it is not possible to extend
his classification to services, because services are typically neither reference priced nor
traded on exchanges.7
I construct a new measure for the communication-intensity of industries that takes
advantage of detailed input output (IO) tables. IO data are available for the manu-
facturing as well as the service sector and allow me to rank all industries according to
their need for communication between trading partners. Thereby I implicitly assume
that the input structure of communication services proxies the need for direct and in-
direct communication between exporter and importer. Given the relatively high level
of aggregation of the trade data, all this assumption postulates is that if the printing
industry needs a larger share of communication inputs than the paper industry rela-
tive to its total inputs, trading printing products also requires more communication
for trade. I measure the direct communication-intensity by the share of telecommu-
nications services in total inputs for each industry. For the industry-specific need to
communicate indirectly via written language, I employ two measures: the input share
of post services and the input share of promotion services (i.e. advertising and enter-
tainment inputs). Since the IO tables at M-level aggregation (2-digit level) exist only
for Canada as a whole, I assume that the average Canadian input structure persists
across provinces. This strong assumption is less problematic in the Canadian case,
where production structures are relatively similar, than in cross-country studies (e.g.
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Nunn, 2007).
The resulting ranking seems reasonable by common sense, as can be seen in ta-
ble 5.3. The share of telecommunication inputs ranges from 0.05% (Fishery) to 5.3%
(Professional services). As expected, table 5.3 shows that service industries are more
communication-intensive than manufacturing industries. Among manufacturing in-
dustries, more complex products are generally ranked higher, which is consistent with
7Experiments with the Rauch data proved inconclusive. I manually matched classifications and
calculated the percentage of goods that is neither reference priced nor traded on public exchanges
for each industry. However, the estimated effects are only significant if trade flows in the (language-
insensitive) petroleum and coal industry are included into the sample.
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the Rauch (1999) classification, where more complex manufactures such as electronic
equipment are rarely reference-priced or traded on an exchange. Also with respect
to post service inputs, services are more communication-intensive than manufactures.
The input share of promotion services differs from the other two measures.
Finally, industries are ranked according to their relative cost of transportation, pre-
supposing that distance has a larger trade diverting impact on industries with higher
transport cost. I calculate the share of transport margins in total inputs, which is
defined as the charges paid to a third party in order to deliver a product from the
producer to the (intermediate or final) purchaser. The ranking of the transport vari-
able in table 5.3 shows that services generally have lower transportation cost than
manufactures. Particularly heavy industries rank high, e.g. metal, mineral products,
chemical, and motor vehicle industries. If not stated differently, I drop the fuel as well
as the petroleum and coal industries from the sample. As these industries are unlikely
to be sensitive to language, the high trade volumes in both industries would bias the
estimates downward (which can be seen in table 5.6).
5.4 Empirical Results
Columns (1), (4), and (7) of table 5.4 report simple correlations between the interac-
tions of telecommunication, post, and promotion services with the log of the bilateral
trade volume. All three interactions exhibit a significant positive correlation, which
provides preliminary evidence in favor of the proposed language-trade channel. Es-
timates of equation (5.1) are reported in columns (3), (6), and (9). As expected,
the transport-distance interaction has a significant negative impact on inter-provincial
trade. The intuition for this estimate is that trade with distant provinces is particularly
low for transport-intensive industries. Moreover, I find that specialization affects trade
positively, which is in accordance with standard trade theory. The estimate implies an
average impact of prodijk on trade of 39%, given the standard deviation of 0.045 of the
production differential within an industry.8 The interaction between language com-
monality and telecommunication-intensity is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This implies an increase of trade volume by 2.64% for an average communication-
intensive industry, when shifting from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution
of langij. For a service-intensive industry such as health, this effect would correspond
8I calculated the effect as %∆tradeijk = 100 ∗ β2 ∗ 0.045 = 100 ∗ 8.647 ∗ 0.045 = 38.91%.
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to an increase of trade by 6.91%.9 There is, however, less evidence for the presence
of an indirect communication channel. The postklangij variable in column (6) is sta-
tistically and economically insignificant. Similarly, the interaction between promotion
services and language commonality is statistically insignificant in column (9), once I
control for bilateral- and industry-fixed-effects. This indicates that industries that rely
on direct interaction in order to export their products trade more between regions with
a high language commonality, whereas indirect communication seems to play a lesser
role.
I also test if the estimated effects are only due to variation in the industry di-
mension or result from joint variation of the interaction effect across industries and
bilateral pairings. Columns (2) and (3) show that the coefficient of the interaction
term is of similar size and also statistically significant at the 10% level if I include both
telecomklangij and telecomk. With respect to post and promotion services, however,
most variation seems to result from the communication-intensities postk and promok.
The estimates of β3 might be biased if determinants of trade have been omitted from
(5.1) that are correlated with the explanatory variables. Warren (2003) argues that the
economic development of the French speaking provinces was retarded. Within Que-
bec most businesses were in the hands of an English speaking minority before strong
French-promoting legislation was passed in the 1970s. If Canada’s English speaking
population were more aﬄuent, all I capture with the language interaction would be
a wealth effect. Hence, I control for the interaction between telecommunication and
joint provincial GDP per capita in column (1) of table 5.5. The insignificance of the
estimate and the fact that the estimated β3 remains practically unchanged indicate
that I am really capturing language effects.
Another reason for bias of β3 could be that other institutional variables that are
correlated with language have been omitted from equation (5.1). It could be that the
foremost Catholic population in French-speaking Canada distrusts Protestant business
partners or exhibits different demand patterns. If this were the case, the alleged lan-
guage effect would really capture religious affiliation. Although Lipset (1990) argues
that religion has a smaller role in Canadian everyday life than in the US, religious com-
monality has been shown to affect international trade patterns (e.g. Lewer and van
den Berg, 2007; Helble, 2007). Hence, I control for the probability that two randomly
chosen people from two states have the same denomination. The religion measure is
highly correlated with language commonality (0.72). Yet the estimate in column (2) is
9These numbers have been calculated for the pairings NL-NU (25th percentile) and ON-PE (75th
percentile), where the effect for an average industry is %∆tradeijk = 100 ∗ β3 ∗ telecomijk ∗ (lang75ij −
lang25ij ) = 100 ∗ 20.23 ∗ 0.0107 ∗ (0.989− 0.868).
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insignificant, while β3 remains a significant explanatory variable of trade. The fact that
the estimate still is of similar magnitude is evidence in favor of the language channel.10
5.5 IV Results
Although the approach taken here reduces several potential sources of bias that are
present in standard gravity models, the estimate of β3 could still be subject to endo-
geneity. I deal with this issue using legal language status as an instrumental variable
(IV).
While Canada’s Official Language Act of 1969 guarantees equal legal status of both
English and French with respect to federal administrative services, federal courts, and
in Parliament, some provinces enacted additional language laws. Particularly, Quebec
and New Brunswick passed own Official Language Acts during the 1970s that promote
the use of French at the work place, in educational institutions, and for administra-
tive procedures. The Official Languages of New Brunswick Act was first enacted in
1973 and later on revised. Likewise, Amendment 16.1 of the Canadian constitution,
which was enacted in 1993, reinforces the equal status of the French language in New
Brunswick. Quebec passed the Official Language Act (Bill 22) in 1974 and the Char-
ter of the French Language (Bill 101) in 1977. Warren (2003) argues that these laws
triggered a revival of the French language in everyday life and also in business, where
English was to become the primary language in the 1970s. Moreover, Lazear (1999)
shows that the protection of minority interests by the government reduces incentives
to learn the majority language, implying lower knowledge of English in those regions
that guarantee specific language rights.
Therefore I use the legal language status across provinces as an instrument for the
probability that two people from two provinces speak the same language. In particular,
I use the interaction cklegalij as an instrument for cklangij, where ck is assumed to be
exogenous. As legal language status is predetermined and unaffected by the trade flow
in 2001, it is a suitable instrument to isolate exogenous variation in language common-
ality. The variable legalij is a dummy, which is one if Quebec or New Brunswick are a
trading partner in a bilateral pairing, two for trade flows between these two provinces,
and zero otherwise.
10Another variable that could be correlated with language commonality is ethnic origin. However,
the data do not allow to disentangle ethnic origin and language ties for French Canadians. Similarly,
constructing an aggregate measure along the lines of equation (5.2) will not yield a consistent proxy
for ethnicity, because large ethnic groups within Canada have ethnic origins that are unlikely to affect
trading patterns, e.g. English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh.
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The IV estimates are reported in table 5.5. I only report second stage estimates.
The statistics from the first stage regressions indicate that the IV estimator can be
used. Columns (3) to (6) report large F statistics and high partial R2s of the first stage
regressions. Also, the instrument cklegalij is significantly partially correlated with
cklangij in the first stage regressions. The IV estimate of langijtelecomk in (3) is posi-
tive and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis of a language-trade channel.
However, the estimate is larger than the OLS estimate in table 5.4, not smaller, as the
potential reverse causality suggests. This could indicate a weak instrument, yet neither
the partial correlations, nor the t-statistic suggest presence of a weak correlation. Also
the Cragg and Donald (1993) test for weak instruments rejects the hypothesis that the
equation is only weakly identified. To test for local average treatment effects, I drop
the three territories from the sample, since they are partly inhabited by natives. This
reduces much of the language variation that cannot be attributed to laws affirming the
use of French in business. The estimate in (4) decreases to a value 23.91 which is close
to the OLS estimates. This corresponds to an increase of trade in the health industry
by 0.26% if langij increases by 1%.
11
As with OLS, the IV estimate of the post service interaction is not significant. The
coefficient for promoijtelecomk is positive and significant but too high compared to the
OLS estimate.
5.6 Robustness
The following section tests the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the sample
and potential bias of the estimates due to the focus on positive trade flows. Table
5.6 reports the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to the removal of influential
observations and the choice of the language variable. The estimates of β3 are obtained
from separate regressions of equation (5.1), using one interaction term in each run.
The upper third of table 5.6 reports coefficients for the interactions between direct
communication-intensities and language commonalities. The middle third reports co-
efficients for interactions with the input share of post services. The bottom of the
table reports interactions with the promotion services-intensity. Direct communication
interactions are statistically significant in all models. Also the 1998 sample confirms
the previous results using Census data on language and ethnicity variables from 1996.
The estimates for the indirect communication channel are in line with the preceding
11The calculation of the partial derivative with respect to langij yields:
∂ ln tradeijk
∂langij
= β3 ∗
telecomk = 23.91 ∗ 0.0107 = 0.26.
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results: A higher language commonality has neither a significant impact on trade in
post service-intensive industries nor in promotion-service-intensive industries.
As a final test, I check if the above analysis is sensitive to the exclusion of zero trade
flows from the sample. In order to account for zero trade flows, I set all observations
for which trade flows are not reported to zero. However, a log-transformation of zero
values is not possible. Several methods have been suggested to deal with this issue.
Sample selection procedures would probably be the most elegant way to adjust the
estimates for zero observations. However, the estimation of sample selection models
requires that at least one independent variable explains the selection process but is not
partially correlated with the dependent variable (in order not to rely on distributional
assumptions). It is hardly possible to find such a variable for the trade data used here.
To get around the selection problem, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest the use of
the Poisson model for gravity equations. The Poisson estimator uses all positive and
zero observations in a way that allows to interpret the coefficients similar to gravity
estimates. Although it is typically used for count data, the Poisson estimator is con-
sistent as long as the mean function is correctly specified. Helpman et al. (2008) find
that a Poisson regression yields estimates that are comparable to a sample selection
procedure.
Column (1) of table 5.7 reports regression results for all combinations of provinces
and territories across all industries. The estimates of the interaction terms are of sim-
ilar magnitude compared to the fixed-effects estimates. In columns (2)-(4), I drop the
fuel as well as the petroleum and coal industries from the sample for comparative pur-
poses. Now the magnitude of the language interaction resembles the IV estimate from
table 5.5.
While most estimates of the interaction terms are of similar size as with the fixed-
effects estimator, the inclusion of zero trade flows has a strong effect on the distance
estimate. The estimated trade barrier of distance is more than twice as large. This
indicates that the predominant reason not to enter a trade relationship with another
province is transport cost.
5.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I find robust evidence for one mechanism that could justify the empirical
evidence for the language barrier to trade in gravity models. Industries that require
more communication with the business partner in order to trade their products, trade
more between Canadian provinces with a high proportion of same-language speakers.
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This language channel appears to depend on direct (spoken) communication rather
than indirect communication via mail or advertising. This is in line with Fink et al.
(2005), who demonstrate the importance of international calling prices for the volume
of bilateral trade. Finally, the significant negative relationship between the volume of
trade and the distance-transport cost interaction holds potential for future applications
of this methodology.
The results indicate that the French-speaking parts of Canada do not only have
a comparative disadvantage in providing communication-intensive services to the rest
of the country, but also face a higher burden on imports of such services. This might
expose the entire economy of minority language regions to higher cost of acquiring
up-to-date services from English-speaking providers. Hence, language might turn out
to be a source of comparative advantage or disadvantage that allows regions with a
higher share of majority language speakers to specialize in more advanced goods and
services. Future research might study in how far this language-trade channel also
applies to international trade. It is likely that language will prove to be an impediment
to trade in services and complex goods that require direct communication with the
foreign importer. Such a finding would suggest that developing countries with few
English-speakers will find it hard to develop competitive services industries in the
future.
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Table 5.2: Bilateral language commonality, 2001
langij Exporter Importer Mean Trade Mean Exports Mean Imports
0.431 QC NU 3.56 4.25 0.95
0.492 QC NL 24.57 30.49 18.31
0.501 SK QC 29.64 21.05 37.96
0.509 QC BC 91.80 111.13 71.30
0.515 QC AB 112.26 122.93 101.59
0.530 QC NT 5.64 6.79 2.09
0.539 QC MB 42.85 40.31 45.72
0.549 QC NS 41.98 51.03 32.09
0.550 YT QC 1.20 0.60 1.41
0.557 QC ON 838.45 774.08 901.12
0.568 QC PE 7.26 8.69 5.45
0.804 NU NB 0.49 0.10 0.62
0.822 QC NB 64.18 64.05 64.32
0.847 NU BC 1.35 0.68 1.55
0.851 ON NU 4.13 4.86 1.70
0.861 NU AB 3.21 0.95 3.94
0.861 NU NT 2.99 1.03 4.95
0.863 NU MB 0.81 0.50 0.92
0.867 SK NU 0.33 0.34 0.24
0.868 YT NU 0.95 1.78 0.13
0.868 NU NL 0.34 0.25 0.37
0.870 NU NS 1.01 0.34 1.28
0.872 PE NU 0.30 0.20 0.60
0.913 NB BC 5.38 5.17 5.59
0.924 NL NB 17.05 20.65 13.79
0.926 SK NB 1.83 1.65 2.03
0.927 NB AB 5.83 4.92 6.73
0.934 NT NB 1.23 0.20 1.43
0.938 ON NB 61.90 86.32 35.27
0.939 NB MB 3.11 3.00 3.22
0.948 YT NB 0.58 0.15 0.65
0.949 NS NB 32.15 31.90 32.38
0.958 PE NB 8.84 6.42 11.05
0.962 ON BC 276.05 373.43 175.81
0.968 NT BC 8.71 15.03 5.65
0.970 BC AB 230.30 226.31 234.39
0.971 MB BC 30.89 34.11 27.77
0.974 SK BC 32.15 28.39 35.91
0.974 NL BC 3.73 2.47 4.55
0.975 ON AB 410.28 463.42 355.57
0.975 ON NT 18.92 13.35 34.68
0.977 YT BC 6.02 7.51 5.07
0.978 NS BC 7.86 6.94 8.77
0.978 ON MB 120.77 135.62 104.65
0.979 SK ON 108.92 92.42 126.39
0.979 ON NL 52.53 68.39 35.14
0.980 PE BC 1.13 0.62 1.46
0.984 NT AB 9.57 2.61 13.49
0.984 YT ON 4.02 2.40 4.60
0.986 ON NS 81.28 109.05 50.91
0.986 MB AB 78.38 67.17 88.96
0.987 NT MB 1.50 0.82 1.76
0.989 SK AB 110.14 85.05 135.23
0.989 PE ON 14.67 9.64 18.17
0.989 SK NT 0.83 0.85 0.78
0.990 NL AB 8.42 2.70 12.30
0.991 NT NL 0.39 0.23 0.44
0.992 SK MB 36.57 35.92 37.31
0.992 YT AB 2.90 1.28 3.60
0.993 NL MB 1.91 1.37 2.20
0.993 YT NT 1.21 2.25 0.28
0.994 NS AB 11.27 10.11 12.36
0.995 NS NT 1.84 2.64 0.34
0.996 YT MB 0.42 0.41 0.42
0.996 PE AB 1.29 1.14 1.39
0.997 SK NL 1.39 1.45 1.27
0.997 YT SK 0.29 0.33 0.28
0.998 PE NT 0.23 0.23 0.20
0.998 NS MB 4.12 3.86 4.38
0.998 YT NL 0.10 0.05 0.11
1.000 SK NS 3.07 2.97 3.18
1.000 PE MB 0.95 1.27 0.74
1.000 PE NL 1.98 2.58 1.43
1.000 NS NL 15.29 19.88 10.84
1.000 YT NS 0.29 0.13 0.36
1.000 PE NS 7.54 5.20 9.80
1.000 YT PE 0.20 - 0.20
1.000 SK PE 0.52 0.63 0.36
Note: Trade is the average bilateral trade across all reported industries in million
Canadian $. langij is the probability that two randomly selected people from
both regions are able to communicate with each other in English, French, or
’Chinese’. Own calculations.
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Table 5.3: Input shares by sector, 2001
Industry Trade Telecoms Post Promotion Transport
in million $ in % in % in % in %
Fishery 6.78 0.05 - 0.09 0.68
Metal 90.31 0.07 0.02 0.24 2.18
Paper 60.41 0.09 0.05 0.62 3.94
Petroleum and Coal 102.60 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.59
Fuels 680.76 0.10 0.03 0.58 0.11
Lumber and Wood 35.25 0.14 0.04 0.51 2.14
Beverages and Tobacco 17.75 0.15 0.07 5.30 0.76
Residential Construction 74.65 0.15 0.07 0.61 0.76
Leather 29.74 0.19 0.19 1.68 0.94
Textiles 22.58 0.19 0.15 0.96 0.54
Hosiery 29.27 0.22 0.25 2.09 0.26
Fabricated Metal 50.42 0.22 0.11 0.91 1.48
Furniture 27.18 0.23 0.21 1.85 1.09
Mineral products 16.89 0.24 0.11 1.10 2.58
Minerals 8.48 0.24 0.08 1.59 0.70
Ores 77.29 0.24 0.08 1.59 0.70
Machinery 31.58 0.27 0.12 1.50 0.90
Motor vehicles, parts 93.38 0.27 0.14 2.01 1.84
Print 34.58 0.28 0.33 1.08 1.41
Manufactured Products 28.69 0.37 0.39 2.56 0.70
Accommodation and Meals 26.22 0.37 0.07 3.11 0.51
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 94.92 0.38 0.22 4.10 2.33
Forestry 26.02 0.40 0.04 0.79 0.20
Mining services 17.71 0.44 0.06 2.57 0.81
Electronic equipment 48.16 0.57 0.20 3.35 1.27
Grains 27.53 0.63 0.00 0.04 1.05
Fruits 82.46 0.63 0.00 0.04 1.05
Meat 88.13 0.63 0.00 0.04 1.05
other Agriculture 59.06 0.83 0.05 0.94 1.50
Retail 25.63 1.01 1.87 5.11 0.07
Finance and Insurance 143.51 1.07 0.56 3.13 0.02
Utilities 43.39 1.13 0.68 3.70 1.01
Educational services 3.32 1.41 0.71 3.63 0.05
Wholesale 140.05 2.27 1.08 6.14 0.13
Communication services 45.52 2.43 5.17 4.69 0.11
Health 3.70 2.52 0.45 1.58 0.05
other Services 51.25 2.82 2.32 17.44 0.39
Transport and Storage 74.00 4.21 1.22 5.18 0.88
Professional services 152.78 5.30 2.55 13.34 0.69
Note: Trade is the average trade in this industry across all reported bilateral flows. Telecommunication,
post, promotion and transportation services inputs shares calculated as the percentage of total inputs in
that industry. Own calculations.
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Table 5.5: Additional regressors and instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(transkdistij) -0.409*** -0.409*** 2.034** 1.259 -0.0801 3.950**
(0.119) (0.119) (0.993) (1.020) (1.024) (1.759)
prodijk 8.646*** 8.647*** 8.657*** 9.591*** 7.858*** 8.650***
(0.967) (0.965) (0.895) (0.896) (0.865) (0.893)
telecomklangij 20.12** 20.22** 38.73*** 23.91**
(8.84) (10.96) (11.24) (11.41)
telecomkGDPpcij 234.6
(3065)
telecomkreligionij -0.0379
(20.12)
postklangij 13.38
(12.62)
promoklangij 10.71***
(3.675)
Observations 3330 3330 3327 2554 3258 3327
F-stat 59.18 59.14 62.76 80.94 63.18 62.92
R2 0.412 0.412 0.411 0.492 0.410 0.410
Cragg-Donald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(p-value)
1st-stage F stat 184.6 155.3 103.4 119.6
1st-stage partial R2 0.435 0.423 0.434 0.441
Note: The estimates are from fixed-effects and fixed-effects instrumental variables regressions of equa-
tion (5.1). The dependent variable is the bilateral trade between provinces i and j. Legal language
status is used as an instrument for langij . All specifications include fixed-bilateral and -industry
effects. In column (4), the sample is restricted to Canada’s ten provinces. The Craag and Donald
(1993) statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model is weakly identified. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Talking Trade 122
Table 5.6: Robustness and sensitivity analysis
Full sample Only Provinces 1998 sample
Telecommunication services
langij 18.17* 19.30** 24.44***
(9.313) (9.161) (9.325)
3409 2554 3072
[154] [90] [131]
workij 18.33** 17.03**
(7.519) (7.333)
3409 2554
[154] [90]
Postal services
langij 0.833 3.039 6.658
(8.204) (8.795) (7.057)
3340 2492 3021
[154] [90] [131]
workij 2.509 4.205
(6.697) (7.087)
3340 2492
[154] [90]
Promotional Services
langij 2.186 1.155 5.854*
(2.905) (3.143) (3.008)
3409 2554 3072
[154] [90] [131]
workij 3.105 1.545
(2.396) (2.559)
3409 2554
[154] [90]
Note: The regressions are estimates of equation (5.1). The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of bilateral trade between provinces i and j. All specifications
include fixed-bilateral and -industry effects. Each entry of the table reports the esti-
mated coefficients for β3 with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Below
this the number of observations in the regression is reported. The number of bilateral
pairings is given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels. The full sample includes also the following sectors: Fuels, Petroleum
and Coal.
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Table 5.7: Robustness to zeros: poisson estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(transkdistij) -0.974*** -0.972*** -0.979*** -0.976***
(0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254)
prodijk 7.029*** 6.916*** 7.001*** 6.920***
(1.496) (1.668) (1.494) (1.693)
telecomklangij 19.30*** 23.36***
(6.062) (5.930)
postklangij 11.82
(7.356)
promoklangij 5.690**
(2.001)
Observations 5610 5466 5454 5466
Pseudo-R2 0.891 0.908 0.892 0.907
Note: The estimates are from poisson regressions of equation (5.1).
The dependent variable is the bilateral trade between provinces i
and j. Column (1) uses all available observations. All specifications
include fixed-bilateral and -industry effects. In columns (2)-(4), the
industries Fuels, Petroleum and Coal have been dropped. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Table 5.8: Variable labels
Label Explanation
tradeijk The trade volume between province or territory
i and province or territory j in industry k in
million Canadian dollars, including zero trade
flows.
ln tradeijk The natural logarithm of tradeijk.
transk The share of transport margins in total inputs
of industry k.
distij The bilateral distance between two capital cities
of provinces or territories.
prodijk The industry differential in the total production
of two provinces.
telecomk The share of telecommunication services in total
inputs of industry k.
postk The share of postal services in total inputs of
industry k.
promok The share of promotional services in total inputs
of industry k.
langij The probability that two randomly chosen peo-
ple from province i and j are able to communi-
cate with each other.
workij The probability that two randomly chosen peo-
ple from province i and j use the same official
language at work.
GDPpcij The joint GDP per capita of provinces i and j.
religionij The probability that two randomly chosen peo-
ple from province i and j have the same religion
or denomination.
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